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LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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CARIBBEAN CONTACT SEES POSSIBLE CONSPIRACY ON GRENADA

Bridgetown CARIBBEAN CONTACT in English Nov 83 pp 19, 20

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Not since the Second World War has the English-speaking Caribbean, which has suffered from centuries of British colonialism before the emergence of US influence and power in this region, have the people been so shaken by tragic and unprecedented events.

CONTROVERSY OVER GOVERNOR GENERAL'S ROLE

Even now there are serious doubts about the accuracy of statements being attributed to the governments of Barbados and Dominica that the Governor General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, who is the Queen's representative on the island, and who was allowed to continue to function by the PRG since the 1979 coup, did in fact request any military invasion of his country by either Caribbean states or the USA.

The Chairman of CARICOM, Prime Minister George Chambers, told his Parliament on October 26 that the first time he knew of the invasion of Grenada was from the US Ambassador to Port-of-Spain.

In his broadcast press statement as Secretary General of

the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), justifying the invasion, Dr. Vaughn Lewis, made no mention of Sir Paul Scoon's involvement in any way with the initiative to resort to force to end the rule in Grenada of the then five-day old Revolutionary Military Council.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said she had received no such requests; the Commonwealth Secretary General, Sir Shridath Ramphal, said as far as he was aware, no such request came from Sir Paul, and he was saying so after a meeting with Queen Elizabeth herself. Ramphal himself condemned the invasion.

Members of the British House of Commons have clearly implied in press statements today that the Prime Minister of Dominica, Ms. Eugenia Charles, had misled

both the United Nations Security Council and the Organisation of American States (OAS) in suggesting that the military intervention was related to a request from Sir Paul Scoon.

As the Queen's representative, they said, Sir Paul could not make such a request to any government or individual other than in representations to Her Majesty, whose representative he remains in Grenada.

The Prime Minister of Barbados, Tom Adams, in a broadcast on October 26 however, also claimed that a request came from Sir Paul and that his country's newly-appointed Brigadier, Rudyard Lewis, was in possession of such a letter.

The question, however, is when was such a letter actually written and under what circumstances?

Political observers are also asking why the US authorities were left to announce that Sir Paul had been "rescued" since the British diplomat who visited Grenada earlier had conveyed no impression to the media of the Governor General being under house arrest or in danger.

No proof has been given as of today that the Governor General was indeed being held hostage by Cubans as alleged to the local and regional media by US information and military personnel.

The 48-year-old Paul Scoon, who has always co-operated with the Bishop Government, is now being asked by the US and some CARICOM Governments to set up a caretaker government, pending new elections which Barbados has volunteered to help arrange.

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Then, later that day, came the announcement that the US Embassy and the US military had "selected" 12 local (Barbadians) and foreign journalists to be flown into Grenada.

They were conducted to "liberated" areas and shown "captured stockpiles" of arms and Cubans taken as prisoners after "fierce fighting".

While President Reagan described, in a broadcast last night, that Grenada was an armed "Soviet-Cuban colony" it has not been forgotten that Grenada, under the People's Revolutionary Government has, for four years, been under constant threat of US-inspired external aggression, just as Nicaragua is today because of Washington's opposition to the Sandinista government.

And, as UK Parliamentarians said during a lively House of Commons debate, the invading forces could not be serious about "restoring democracy" since under the Gairy regime, overthrown by Bishop and his colleagues, there was "no democracy".

When the US information system was not stating their allegations about the extent of Soviet and Cuban armed personnel and military material encountered during the battles for "liberation", Caribbean radio listeners were hearing that the new airport the Cubans were building for the Grenadians at Point Saline, was in fact an "armed camp" with special trenches dug for military combat.

Strangely, none of the US medical students who have been living in this area for years, or none of the US Congressmen or journalists who had frequently toured the airport project had ever made such a discovery.

The destruction of the Grenadian revolutionary experiment has dealt a fatal blow to the entire Caribbean left and has gladdened the hearts of more than the known Reaganites.

At this time, while the controversy raged over Sir Paul Scoon's role in the invasion, informed political observers are raising a number of questions.

One is: Since the USA had failed to consult its NATA allies, especially Britain, Canada and France--all of whom have interests in this region--and since the Governments of the OECS, Barbados and Jamaica had failed to inform the current Chairman of CARICOM, George Chambers, about the invasion plans, was there a conspiracy involving regional and American governments to smash the system of government in Grenada through the use of force?

Undoubtedly, the debate over this entire frightening episode in the history of the Commonwealth Caribbean is just beginning!

CSO: 3298/176

GUATEMALA REQUIRES CLEARANCE FOR EXPORTS TO NICARAGUA

Monetary Board Outlines Policy

Guatemala City EL IMPARCIAL in Spanish 5 Nov 83 p 12

[Text] Bank of Guatemala

Exports to Nicaragua

The Foreign Exchange Department of the Bank of Guatemala hereby notifies all exporters of merchandise to the Republic of Nicaragua of the following policy:

1. By means of Monetary Board Resolution No 10097, dated 2 November 1983, effective Monday, 7 November, prior registration is required for all exports to the Republic of Nicaragua.
2. Exporters must complete the form "Request for Export License," Form No A-20131, which may be obtained from the Foreign Exchange Department, level 1, south wing of the Main Building, Bank of Guatemala or from agencies located in the departmental seats of Escuintla, Cuilapa, Jutiapa, Jalapa, Chiquimula and Zacapa.
3. The exporter must bring the following documents, along with this form, to the Foreign Exchange Department or to one of the agencies cited: the foreign exchange authorization card, a copy of the invoice and the Customs Form so that the export license can be authorized and issued no later than the next workday following its receipt.
4. The customs offices have received instructions to permit the shipment of merchandise only upon presentation of the required license.
5. For the purposes of paying off every export license, a percentage of no less than 80 percent in U.S. dollars will be accepted, with the remaining 20 percent by check in cordobas payable through the Central American Clearinghouse. Said payment must be made within a period of 45 days after the issuance date of the respective License.

Payments for services or other items only will be accepted by the Bank of Guatemala or any of the banks authorized to issue bills of exchange or money orders expressed in U.S. dollars.

6. Enterprises and individual persons who on this date have accounts payable from the Republic of Nicaragua for exports, services or other items should make a declaration of the amount of such credits to the Export and Registration Section of the Foreign Exchange Department before 15 November 1983.

They should also declare advance payments made against future shipments.

The following merchandise is exempt from the export license requirement:

a. Exports of household goods, personal effects and articles which are part of carryon luggage.

b. Exports in noncommercial quantities whose FOB worth is not more than the equivalent of 100 quetzals.

c. Exports of samples of traveling salesmen, both national and foreign.

d. Exports of goods in Section 931-02-00-02 of the Customs Tariff list.

e. Movie films which enter the country on a temporary basis.

f. Printed tourist literature or information about Guatemalan products.

8. Additional information can be obtained by calling telephone numbers: 53-40-32, 53-40-35, 53-59-92 and 53-59-93.

Bank of Guatemala,
Guatemala, November 1983

Measure Against Increased Nicaraguan Debt

Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 8 Nov 83 p 15

[Text] "Nicaragua owes Guatemala about \$190 million; and, therefore, our government has ordered prior registration of exports to that country," Economy Minister Leonel Hernandez Cardona said yesterday.

The official added that the measure was adopted to prevent the debt from increasing more than it now is, as it will be very difficult for Nicaragua to pay because of the crisis it is now going through, just as it has been unable to make payments for over one and a half years.

"If they propose a method of payment to us, we could be more flexible. In the meantime, we have to protect our country's economy by exercising control over products being sent to Nicaragua," he emphasized.

In another of his statements, the minister of economy said that the Common Market is passing through a profound crisis. But in spite of that, the Common Market will not disappear, he said finally.

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CSO: 3248/176

COLOMBIA AGREES TO FINANCE EXPORTS TO CENTRAL AMERICA

Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 10 Nov 83 p 14

[Text] An important news item which will surely interest the commerce and industry of our country has been released by Dr Camilo Acevedo, commercial attache of the Colombian Embassy in Guatemala: the Colombian Government has agreed to finance exports of Colombian products to Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica up to \$10 million.

This line of credit was established in favor of the Export Promotion Plan (PROEXPO), which will conclude an agreement with the Central American Monetary Council to determine the conditions and requirements for the use of these funds.

The line of credit will have a maximum term of 2 years, and the credits granted must be paid back within a maximum time frame of 1 year, when these funds have been used to finance exports of consumer goods; up to 3 years for intermediate goods; and up to 5 years for all other goods.

The interest rate to be charged by the Bank of the Republic of Colombia for the use of these funds will be 8 percent per year, and this institution together with PROEXPO will determine the modus operandi for the line of credit.

Dr Acevedo said that he was very pleased with this financial decision by his country's government, as he feels it will be of mutual benefit to the businessmen of both countries.

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CSO: 3248/176

GUATEMALA, MEXICO CONTINUE TO DEBATE REFUGEE STATISTICS

Guatemala City EL IMPARCIAL in Spanish 11 Nov 83 pp 1, 7

[Text] Haroldo Cabrera Enriquez, vice-minister of government, did not know until noon that he was a member of a commission which will travel to Mexico to make a physical recount of the real number of refugees in Chiapas State who come from different Guatemalan departments.

Unofficial sources say that Col Miguel Fernando Fuentes will also be a member of that commission. In the company of the vice-minister of government, he will travel to the neighboring country in a few days, with the prior approval of the Mexican authorities, to make that recount, which is considered important. It will permit the giving of assistance to those who wish to return from their temporary voluntary exile, as was done by other countrymen, it was said.

In fact, according to Foreign Ministry sources--including the acting vice-minister, Federico Fahsen--the number of Guatemalan refugees is not over 10,000.

However, the Mexican authorities, including Ambassador Rafael Macedo Figueroa, have stated that the number of Guatemalans who have crossed the Mexican border fleeing from violence and other troubles is over 30,000.

Since there is obviously a contradiction between the figure given by our country and that of the Mexican Government, a census is desired, with a view to having a figure which effectively is the true reflection of the real number of fellow countrymen who have sought refuge on Mexican soil.

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RECENT, PAST ELECTION VOTING PATTERNS COMPARED, ANALYZED

Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish 4 Nov 83 pp 36-42

[Text] Anyone who takes the trouble to peruse in some detail the final figures in the electoral vote count, province by province, may notice one fundamental fact: the thoughtful formulation of the voting in the entire country. There were some who thought, rather superficially, that there would be a splitting of ballots and combinations of parties only in the federal capital, and that in the interior they would choose to follow a ticket number and simplify their decision. The election results show otherwise: Both in the capital and elsewhere in the nation, the vote was carefully calibrated. Comparing the numbers in the various categories (and, furthermore, comparing them with those of the 1973 elections) is now proving to be an exciting task.

UCR [Radical Civic Union], as the part of the winning presidential candidate, prevailed in seven provinces and the national territory of Tierra del Fuego (which does not elect a governor, but does vote for electors of the president and vice president, as well as for two national deputies). The Radical votes made off with the governorships of Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Misiones, Mendoza, Chubut, Rio Negro and Entre Rios; while the Justicialists gained strength in Salta, Tucuman, Jujuy, La Rioja, Catamarca, Chaco, Formosa, La Pampa, San Luis, Santa Cruz and Santa Fe.

The provincial parties imposed their candidates in three states. In Neuquen, the leadership of the Neuquen Popular Movement (of the Sapags) remained intact; in San Juan, Leopoldo Bravo's bloc movement won; and in Corrientes, Jose Antonio Romero Feris' Liberal Autonomous Pact won.

This picture shows an obvious difference from that of 1973, when the Campora-Solano Lima slate was adopted. On that occasion, only Neuquen (with Felipe Sapag) did not have a FREJULI [Justicialist Liberation Front] governor. Everywhere else in the country, the Peronist Front supremacy was total.

Buenos Aires: the Great Shakeup

No election result on Sunday was more decisive for Raul Alfonsin's victory than that of Buenos Aires Province. Not even the very great difference that the federal capital made in his favor (where he was backed by 64.23 percent of the citizenry) had the effect of those 515,788 light votes which the Radical

candidate gained in what has always been an unchangeable Peronist stronghold; because it is well known that the difference that the PJ [Justicialist Party] was used to obtaining in the industrial belt always proved greater than the ground that UCR could recover in the capital and other strong interior districts.

This time it was different. Of the 19 parties in the Buenos Aires conurban area, 12 remained in Radical hands: namely, Tigre, San Fernando, San Isidro, Vicente Lopez, San Martin, Tres de Febrero, Esteban Echeverria, Lomas de Zamora, Almirante Brown, Quilmes, Lanus and Avellaneda itself, where the Peronist candidate for governor himself, Herminio Iglesias, was a superintendent. The seven other parties (Florencio Varela, Berazategui, Moron, La Matanza, Moreno and General Sarmiento) will have Justicialist superintendents.

Therein lay the key. With even numbers in Greater Buenos Aires, the interior section of the province exerted the weight of its strong pro-Alfonsinist movement and established Alejandro Armendariz as governor-elect. The 515,788-vote difference in white ballots for electors of the president was stretched to 650,588 in the blue ones, that is, in the category of candidates for governor. Also in that category, there was an increase in white votes (about 247,000 more than those won by the third party, the Intransigent); indicating a number of Peronist votes which left out Iglesias' nomination. All the other small parties also had more blue than white ballots.

Buenos Aires Province is sending 144 electors of the president, and elected 70 national deputies, 38 of whom were Radicals, 30 Peronists and the other two from PI [Intransigent Party], which attained a percentage of 4.70 on the slate of candidates for governor. The polarization (a constant feature in these elections) was extremely great in the first state: more than 93 percent among voters of the two majority parties.

Ten years ago, FREJULI won the Buenos Aires elections with such a wide margin that a runoff election was not required: 2,328,313 votes as compared with 939,070 for the Radicals. Now, despite the large number of new voters, its figures are almost the same, whereas the Radicals' increased by 303 percent.

Ballots Were Not Mixed in Cordoba

In Cordoba (unlike many provinces) the parties' ballots were not mixed, and there was almost no change in figures between the presidential rivals, those for governor and those for congressional representatives. The Cordoban voted in a bloc: complete ballot. The Radicals won (with their candidate, Eduardo Angeloz) over PJ (which carried the nomination of Raul Bercovich Rodriguez); and the percentages are nearly equal in all categories: 55 percent for UCR in electors of the president; with 55 percent also for UCR in Angeloz' blue ballots and 54 percent for national deputies. The Peronists were held to 40 percent for Luder, 39 for Bercovich and 39 for deputies. There was a 217,000-vote difference between the two parties.

In 1973, FREJULI had narrowly beaten the Radicals in the first balloting (with about 80,000 votes), and in the runoff retained the advantage, receiving backing equivalent to that for UCR in the polarization.

In Sunday's elections, the smaller Cordoban parties were very far removed from the majority ones which, combined, monopolized 95 percent of the electorate. A distant third place went to MID [Integration and Development Movement] (for governor), with about 20,000 votes, which declined to 13,072 for electors of the president of the nation. There, in the white votes, the Intransigents (with 12,173) and the Democrats (with 12,126) came close to it. What was considerable (and in all categories) was white votes: With 25,000 and 20,000, respectively, they took third place both on the slate of candidates for governor and on that for presidential electors. As a counterpart, Cordoba was (along with the Federal Capital and La Pampa) one of the districts with the greatest volume of voters.

Bercovich Rodriguez was the first candidate for governor who admitted electoral defeat on Sunday night, 30 October. Before 2200 hours, he had already held a telephone dialog with Angeloz, and that fraternal atmosphere continued the next day with a greeting between the two in the presence of the provincial press.

Chaco: By a Head

As anticipated, Chaco's would prove to be one of the most dramatic elections in the country; and it was, as in both Santa Fe and Chubut, which were also marked by a small difference in votes.

In Chaco, there were 157,000 votes for the Justicialist Party versus 153,000 for the Radical Civic Union. Those 4,000 votes made candidate Florencio Tenev governor-elect over Luis Leon. But the tie situation that was to occur in the provincial legislature when it was time to elect the two national senators from Chaco could result in an intermediate solution (one for each party; mention was made of Leon and Bittel); and if this occurs it could have a considerable effect on the formation of the future Senate which has appeared with a Peronist majority up until now.

Tenev was minister of government during Bittel's terms as governor; in other words, after the 1973 elections. The Chaco voter was even more polarized when voting for electors for the president: Each party added 2,000 votes to the governor's figures. Those votes came from MID (which yielded nearly 3,000 in the presidential category), from Chaco Unity and from the Christian Democratic Party, each of which also lost 1,000. Ten years ago, the Chaco elections were decided in the first balloting; FREJULI, with 191,000 votes, easily won over the Radicals, who approached 65,000.

The Two Sides of Santa Fe

Another dramatic election took place here, even closer than the one in Chaco. For governor, the Justicialist Jose Maria Vernet won over the Radical, Luis Anibal Reynaldo by 11,000 votes (representing a difference of 0.6 percent). But on the national level, the electorate changed the figures, and ended up sending four more electors for Alfonsin than for Luder. The key to this cautious advancement on the national and provincial levels revolves around the Progressive Democratic Party, traditionally powerful in that province. The

Progressive Democrats emerged with 136,000 votes for governor (third place), but they reduced that figure in white votes: for the Socialist Democratic Alliance (which they belong to on the national level), there were only 15,722 of those 136,853 votes. The rest were channeled to UCR, which improved by 10 percent in comparison with the results of its two-name ticket for governor.

In the case of national deputies, the Progressive Democrats also turned to UCR, although to a lesser extent. In any event, they repeated the phenomenon, and so 10 Radical and nine Peronist deputies are going to Buenos Aires, despite the fact that the Santa Fe governor is a member of PJ.

MID, at other times a powerful force in the province (in 1973, it represented FREJULI and won by a wide margin), declined considerably: with under 30,000 votes for governor, and over 20,000 for the Frigerio-Salonia ticket.

Sapag's Neuquen

The Neuquen Popular Movement is still keeping its electoral power in the province intact, and the rule did not even have the exception of 1973: In that year, it was the only province in which FREJULI did not win. Now, with the veiled insinuation that its electors would vote for Alfonsin in the Electoral College, the numbers game in the province will be a long affair.

For example, for the category of governor and vice governor, Sapa came out with over 56,000 votes, nearly 55 percent of the total voters' registration. Very far removed came PJ (23,284) and the Radical Party (21,095). But in that of presidential electors, MPN dropped to 28,000, and that difference went to UCR, which attained 46,000 and cleared seven electors, as compared with four for Sapag's party and three for the Peronist Party. In the category of deputies as well, the MPN voters went for UCR (but less so), and thus established two Radicals and two of its own. The fifth deputy to be sent by the province is a Justicialist, a party which was dissociated from all these fluctuations and obtained 22 percent in the three categories of votes.

The Case of Salta

Salta, like the entire northwest, elected a Justicialist governor. But the case of Salta is significant: While Roberto Romero won his candidacy by a wide margin (nearly 51 percent, 148,000 votes as compared with 80,000 for the Radicals), the votes for electors for Alfonsin were virtually tied with those for Luder, at 132,000. The ups and downs of the D'Hont system caused the emergence of one more elector (nine to eight) for Luder, despite the fact that the difference between the two was only 109 votes.

Salta had a FREJULI government 10 years ago, without requiring a runoff election. On that occasion, the Peronist front took 120,000 votes, and its two closest rivals, the Federalist Popular Alliance and UCR, received about 30,000 votes. Hence, the Radical leap in electors for Alfonsin is noteworthy, although it should be borne in mind that the outside support was provided by Salta's Renewal Party, which won 48,510 votes for governor (the third force) and its voters preferred Alfonsin over Luder.

Radical Misiones

The physician, Ricardo Barrios Arrechea, of UCR, fulfilled the prior predictions, and emerged with the governorship of Misiones; although the difference in votes in comparison with his Justicialist adversary, Julio Cesar Humada, was narrower than anticipated.

The Radicals attained 50.29 percent of the vote, three points more than PJ; which means a 7,700-vote advantage. But, contrary to what occurred in other provinces, Barrios Arrechea received more ballots for his candidacy than those for electors of the president and vice president: 2,643 more. This was repeated only in Cordoba, where Angeloz also received 1,386 votes more than the white ballots.

Misiones has always been a very contentious province. In the 1973 elections, it required a runoff election to establish FREJULI's Irrazabal-Aryault ticket, opposing Barrios Arrechea himself. In that final decision, the result was 82,000 votes versus 55,000.

Last Sunday, the Justicialists received 1,050 votes more in the presidential electors category than in that for governor. The third provincial force, although far removed, is MID, with less than 2 percent of the electorate. One infers from this the enormous polarization, which amounted to 97.44 percent in Misiones.

Juarez Monopolizes Santiago

This was another province in which the Justicialist victory was taken for granted, particularly because of Carlos Arturo Juarez' personal influence. The final figures showed 47.8 percent of the vote for the former governor (now newly elected), with nearly 130,000 votes, exactly the same number that Luder obtained for electors.

What changed, on the other hand, was the Radical Party. From 32.4 percent of the votes for governor given to its candidate, Benjamin Zavalia, it rose to 41.4 percent on the electors' slate; which gave it a difference of only one elector in comparison with the Justicialist Party (eight versus nine). This recovery was rather surprising, and so was the Radical victory for the superintendency of the capital, where Bruno Volta was installed.

Ten years ago, Santiago del Estero experienced a troublesome electoral situation, which even necessitated the postponement of the runoff election. When the conflict was cleared up (having originated with demands for justice), a FREJULI-Revolutionary Popular Alliance merger defeated the other one comprised of MID and a sector of PJ by less than 2,000 votes.

Santa Cruz: the Anticipated Difference

The most reliable calculations of the electoral situation in Santa Cruz gave a slight advantage of 3,000 votes to the Justicialist Party over UCR.

That enlightened guess was borne out mathematically: In the category of electors of the president, Luder emerged with 22, 172 votes, and Alfonsin with 19,423. In any event, the electors were seven and seven.

For governor, the gap widened. Although there were no major changes in the other parties (but there were more white votes and MID votes), the Justicialist advantage amounted to nearly 6,000 votes, nearing 55.7 percent of the total. This established Arturo Antonio Puricenni as governor of the province. In the category of deputies, the figures again neared the difference of 3,000, and Santa Cruz ended up sending three Justicialist and two Radical representatives to the Lower Chamber.

Guerrero's Escalation

When Osvaldo Alvarez Guerrero began his campaign in the Rio Negro internal Radical election, as a Renewal and Change precandidate, few people seriously considered his chances of defeating National Line, which had been leading the party without difficulty. But after a visit by Alfonsin to the province, a snowball effect began, culminating in Guerrero's victory in the internal election and, eventually, in Sunday's provincial election.

UCR gathered 52.7 percent of the Rio Negro votes (nearly 83,000), as compared with 57,847 for the Peronist candidate, Mario Jose Franco, who was hoping to capitalize on the voters from the now very small Rio Negro Provincial Party, which was the second-ranking force in the province 10 years ago. PPR received only 3,235 votes for governor, and since that figure was reduced to 873 on slates of presidential electors, it is thought that a considerable number of the remaining 2,362 votes went to Luder. However, Alfonsin exceeded his presidential opponent by over 20,000 votes, and emerged with eight electors, in contrast to six for the Rio Negro Peronists.

In 1973, the difference between FREJULI and the parties following it (PPR and UCR) was sufficiently wide to preclude holding the runoff election; despite the fact that the percentage amounted to 74, not the official 50.1. At that time, the volume for the Provincial Party totaled 24,000 votes, eight times more than now; and the Radical vote was 20,000, four times less than at present. There is a key in this: While the Radical Party quadrupled, the Justicialist Party made a meager progress of 18 percent.

La Pampa: Peronism and Nuances

Before the La Pampa elections, the unknown factor was the position that the Pampa Federal Movement, headed by Ismael Amit, would assume. Now, in the light of the results, it is known that the 25,509 votes that he won for the governor's election and that ranked him third (after the Peronist Ruben Marin, a former vice governor, and the Radical Antonio Berhongaray) was the swing that evened up the presidential election in the province. Thus, while the Justicialist Party took 40 percent of the vote for governor, compared with 32 percent for UCR, both parties were tied at 41 percent in the white votes, and sent six electors for president to the Electoral College.

MFP dropped from 25,509 to 15,317, from governor to president. Those 10,000 votes were essential to the Radical gain of electors. Marin will govern with a minority chamber (nine Justicialists versus seven Radicals, four Federals and one from MID). There is also a possibility that La Pampa will send to the Senate one Justicialist senator and one Radical; and if this should be confirmed, it would be (like the situation in Chaco) very important to the critical balance in the Upper Chamber.

The Pact in Corrientes

Autonomists and Liberals again showed their noteworthy influence on the Corrientes electorate, which remains intact, with considerable parity between the two parties. The Pact emerged with 147,133 votes for governor, an overwhelming 46 percent, which left both Justicialists and Radicals without a chance in the electoral college of the province (Corrientes, together with Mendoza and Tucuman, elect the governor indirectly). With that percentage, the Autonomists and Liberals won 14 provincial electors, as opposed to six for PJ (74,817 votes) and another six for UCR (67,047).

On the national level, the Pact declined to under 95,000 votes, entailing a drop of 52,000, which went to the electoral coffers of Raul Alfonsin. Thus, UCR won seven electors for president, versus six for the Pact and five for the Justicialists.

On the other hand, the voters divided (as had been anticipated) the votes for deputies between Autonomists and Liberals. The former numbered more: 64,000 versus 44,000. Each gained a deputy, while the Peronists won two and the Radicals three.

Ten years ago, the Pact lost to FREJULI by a 55,000-vote difference. Now, it has ended up establishing Jose Antonio Romero Feris as governor-elect.

The Big Event in Mendoza

Few expected in Mendoza such a clearcut victory as that won by the Radicals (47.4 percent of the vote for governor), in a province that has never favored them. That advantage increased until it was close to 58 percent in electors for the president of the nation.

Santiago Llaver, a Radical candidate for governor, won 292,000 votes, as compared with 222,000 for his Peronist adversary, Jose Carlos Motta. The Democrats, always a powerful force in the province, won 78,388, but that figure dropped by over 60,000 votes on the slate of presidential electors. The shift swelled the figures of UCR, whose increase in that category was, precisely, 66,000 votes. The other parties also had variations, but of a lesser nature: MID declined from 13,800 (governor) to 7,160 (president); and PI could not run for governor, but won 6,070 white-colored votes.

As a reference to the change in the Mendoza electoral picture, it would suffice to compare these figures with those for 1973, when FREJULI won 366,000 votes, versus a distant 137,000 for the Democrats.

Formosa: Peronist Victory

There were no surprises in Formosa. Floro Bogado, a young lawyer from the province, was established as governor after gaining a comfortable advantage over the Radicals and MID.

Bogado attained 43.6 percent of the vote (over 50,000), as compared with 27.8 percent for the Radical Antonio Pereyra, and the rounded 23 percent for MID's Rodolfo Rihner, who in previous roles had already seemed to be a candidate with a good election in the province. The MID votes declined 10 percent in the count for president and vice president, and for national deputies. On the other hand, the Radical votes increased by another 10 percent, while Luder also gained two more percentage points than the ticket for the Formosa government. Hence, he claimed seven electors, versus seven for Alfonsin and two for MID. In the category of deputies, however, the five seats were divided into three and two, for Justicialists and Radicals.

Almost Without Surprises

Despite the fact that the Tucuman election held a certain amount of suspense when the votes were counted, eventually, neither that province nor Catamarca brought any surprises with regard to the electorate's orientation. In both instances, the Justicialists prevailed, as in past elections, although Catamarca did not show the difference anticipated by the analysts.

Fernando Viero was elected Tucuman's governor by nearly 246,000 votes, 71,000 more than his Radical opponent, Julio Romano Norri, received. Arriving third was the Federal Vanguard-Christian Democratic alliance (led by Celestino Gelsi), with 26,000 votes, which later went to the candidacy of electors for Alfonsin. In that area, UCR reduced the difference with PJ: 41.9 percent versus 51.69 percent for the Peronists.

In Catamarca, the Justicialist candidate, Ramon Saadi, defeated the Radical Ernesto Alderete Salas by 41,379 votes versus 37,794; but the Alfonsinists received more votes than Luder: 48,590 versus 45,105. Both parties sent seven presidential electors. The turn toward the Radical Party occurred because of the action of voters from the Catamarca Popular Movement, which won 16,883 votes in the count for governor and vice governor, but declined to 4,456 in electors for the president. Those 12,000 large votes may explain the increase of nearly 11,000 that the Radical Civic Union had in the nomination of Alfonsin in the province.

In the category of national deputies, Catamarca is sending three Justicialists and two Radicals to the National Congress.

San Luis: Another Crossover Vote

The phenomenon of the crossover vote occurred in San Luis as well: For governor, they elected a Justicialist, but the recount of ballots for presidential

electors brought obvious advantages for Raul Alfonsin. Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, of PJ, won 40.4 percent of the total vote for governor, compared with 37.6 percent for the Radical Carlos Edgardo Zavala. Those percentages actually represented 3,300 votes, but the figures were reversed for electors of the president, wherein the Radicals showed an advantage of 9,000 votes. If one delves into the partial upsets, there is the figure for MID, which dropped from 17,299 (governor) to 4,387 (electors); and part of that volume might have been channeled toward UCR. The Federal Alliance also declined by 2,800 votes, which would also have gone to the Radicals on the national level.

The Entre Rios Upset

Before the election, both Peronists and Radicals seemed quite convinced of victory. Calculations and forecasts differed considerably, but, in the end, the numbers favored the UCR candidate, Sergio Montiel, rather easily, over the Justicialist Dardo Pablo Blanc: 260,106 versus 213,989. Hence, Montiel received close to 50 percent of the Entre Rios votes.

In the category of electors of the president and vice president, on the other hand (and contrary to what happened in most of the provinces), the Radicals yielded part of the ground (4,000 votes), while the Peronists recovered nearly 17,500. Several parties may have contributed to that rearrangement: the Popular Line Movement (which declined from 14,983 to 3,282, from governor to electors); MID (which also declined, although to a lesser extent: from 11,635 to 8,254); and other smaller parties. In the category of deputies, Entre Rios is sending five Radicals and four Justicialists to the Congress of the Nation.

Jujuy: Snopek, Easily

Engineer Carlos Snopek won by a wide margin in the Jujuy elections, accumulating almost as many votes as the Radicals and "Jujuy Populares" combined; that is, the two parties following his in order of the vote count. The Justicialist candidate won 81,000 votes, versus 45,318 for UCR and 38,966 for the Jujuy Popular Movement. In the category of presidential electors, the Radicals shortened the gap, and won six, in comparison with eight electors for Luder and two for the provincial parties.

In the category of provincial deputies, the Peronists won three seats, compared with two for the Radicals and one for the "Jujuy Populares," which therefore established their candidate, Maria Cristina Guzman. The latter occurred because the split in the MPJ between ballots for governor and for electors (a 17,000-vote difference in favor of the governor category) was reduced considerably in the election for deputies, which enabled the party to obtain the nomination of one.

Ten years ago, Jujuy had a FREJULI government in the first balloting. At that time, the Front won nearly 65,000 votes, versus 34,495 for the Jujuy Popular Movement. The Radicals had very small figures; that is why their recovery now is highly significant.

San Juan in a Bloc

History has repeated itself: The San Juan bloc movement won the elections for governor, establishing in the position Leopoldo Bravo, former provincial chief executive. Bravo received nearly 96,000 votes, about 40 percent, and left Peronists (with 30 percent) and Radicals (with 21) far behind.

On the other hand, the list of presidential electors indicated a substantial victory for Alfonsín: UCR won 97,274 votes (about 45,000 more than for governor), obtaining seven seats for the Electoral College, compared with five Justicialists and four bloc members. This split in the bloc movement also occurred for deputies, and it all ended in a triple tie: two deputies for each one of the three parties: what is known as a "calibrated" vote.

The 1973 precedent also showed the power of the San Juan provincial party. The bloc movement won the first balloting for governor, yielding only to FREJULI in votes, by a margin of 107,000 to 93,000 votes.

Vote By Vote in Chubut

The numbers tell it all: The Radicals won the governorship of Chubut by 44,295 votes to 43,389 for the Peronists, a difference of 906 votes which established Atilio Viglione as provincial chief executive running against Hebe Blasco. Possibly the most disputed elections on Sunday, they were decided vote by vote.

The Radical Party procured a considerable advantage (10,700 votes) with respect to electors of the president, wherein it succeeded in taking part of the volume of the Chubut Action Party, which took 16.7 percent of the vote on the provincial level, and dropped to 2.7 percent on the national level.


La Rioja: Menem's Territory

Last Sunday, 57.32 percent of La Rioja's inhabitants reiterated their electoral support for Carlos Saul Menem, a personage with an increasing projection in the Peronist Party. Rather far removed from those 49,349 votes were the 34,069 of the Radicals (39.5 percent); whereas the other parties were left pulverized by the polarization, which amounted to 97 percent in this province.

For president, on the other hand, there was a repetition of the usual phenomenon in the spectrum of provinces won by the Peronists: the recovery of ground by the Alfonsínist electors. Of the 14 electors, eight were Justicialists and six from UCR.


Tierra del Fuego Radicals

There remains the case of Tierra del Fuego which, as a national territory, did not elect a governor, but did elect two national deputies and four electors of the president. The narrow margin of the Radical victory (5,300 to 4,132) caused UCR and PJ to equal the number of electors (two and two), and the deputies to be distributed as well. In this latter category the difference was less: the Radicals drew 30 votes; MID was a distant third, with 359.



Key to Map 1:

1. Justicialist Liberation Front
2. Provincial Parties
3. Federal Capital
4. National Territory of Tierra del Fuego
5. Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands



Key to Map 2:

1. Radical Civic Union
2. Justicialist Party
3. Provincial Parties
4. Federal Capital
5. National Territory of Tierra del Fuego
6. Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands

2909

CSO: 3348/61

RIOTS BREAK OUT IN VARIOUS PRISONS; INMATES ISSUE DEMANDS

Hundreds Riot

Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 3 Nov 83 p 27

[Text] In a movement threatening to expand, several hundred inmates held at Model No 9 in La Plata, Unit No 1 in Olmos, the Police Prison in Resistencia and the Villa Las Rosas Provincial Jail in Salta for common crimes have rioted, demanding reductions in their sentences. The first conflict came at the Olmos prison, with slogans alluding to the process of democratization that began on Sunday with the national elections. Subsequently, inmates at the other penal institutions joined the protest, asking to talk with officials. Francisco Duranona y Vedia, minister of government of Buenos Aires, and Hector Mamblona, undersecretary of justice, are analyzing ways of solving the delicate problem.

La Plata

The riot of the 1,040 inmates at Unit 9 of the Penitentiary Service, known as the La Plata Model Prison, complicated the picture which on Tuesday appeared on the way to a solution, as a result of the passage by the Buenos Aires Executive Branch of the Sentence Commutation Law and the imminent signing by Governor Jorge Aguado of the text on the release and exemption from prison with reforms in the Penal Code, documents which Minister of Government Francisco de Duranona y Vedia had turned over to inmates at the Olmos prison, a condition imposed by the inmates before they would halt their protest.

Some 350 prisoners who refused to give in were taken into protective custody by penal authorities and transferred to Unit 9, provoking the reaction of prisoners at Unit 9, who call the new arrivals sheep. The inmates started their rebellion at 0300 hours and occupied several strategic areas. Soldiers and other provincial police were called to the prison from streets 11 and 75 and, along with members of the Penitentiary Service, formed a security belt around the outer walls. As in the case of Olmos, the rioters asked to talk with the minister of government, who said that the committee with which he spoke said that the main demand was speedier handling of trials. There are no known cases of guards being held hostage.

Tension in Olmos

This situation was reflected at the Olmos prison, whose inmates had handed over hostages they taken but who had not given up their belicose attitude. Throughout the night they kept the neighborhood in an atmosphere of uncertainty, causing reinforcements to be sent to the guards.

Some 500 prisoners were on the roof of the building and the sheets painted with the already familiar slogans were joined by others saying "We Want Freedom," "Where Are Human Rights?" "Enough 19th Century Torture," "No More Stories," and other sayings.

Late yesterday afternoon, scuffles occurred between prisoners at the Olmos unit over differences regarding the demand made by the undersecretary of justice, Hector Mamblona, to abandon their rebellious attitude and hand over the occupied facilities to Penitentiary Service authorities.

The consequences of the fights are not known but several inmates were reportedly wounded. Penal court Judge Horacio Daniel Piombo went to the prison to learn the latest news and said that the damage is substantial. It extends to the hospital, where valuable dental equipment has been ruined.

The main leaders of the movement reportedly number 14 and have records of being extremely dangerous, as a result of which, according to Dr Mamblona, they are not covered by the sentence commutation law passed by the government on 28 October but not yet published in the BOLETIN OFICIAL.

For his part, the minister of government of Buenos Aires, Francisco de Duranona y Vedia, said last night there "there have been no new measures of force or any more damage by the rioting inmates of the Olmos, No 9 and La Plata prisons. He added that the provincial government is "awaiting a solution to be worked out by both sides." De Duranona y Vedia later said that "the government is capable of regaining control of the prisons whenever necessary, but that for the time being, it is waiting and will continue to talk with the inmates in order to reach a final solution of benefit to both sides."

Resistance

Some 120 inmates at the Police Jail in Resistencia rioted yesterday shortly after noon, taking about 12 hostages, eight of them police officers from Chaco Province, and demanding that authorities reduce sentences by 30 percent, reform the Penal Code and grant better living conditions.

It was learned that the examining magistrate of the Sixth Court of Resistencia, Dr Luis Felipe Gentile, had intervened and that Dr Fernando Medina Alliana, minister of government, the chief of police of Chaco, General Commissioner Sotero Cayo Alegre, and members of his staff, along with criminologists from that city and Corrientes, had gone to the prison to speak with the rioters.

The provincial prison is located about 10 kilometers from the heart of the city, near the International Airport of Resistencia and 400 meters from National Road 11. Access is gained by a paved road. The establishment operates practically as a prison for the prosecuted because those serving a sentence are housed in Penal Unit 7, under the Federal Penitentiary Service. There are also barracks for women, who did not participate in the rioting.

Based on the data obtained, the rioting came shortly after noon yesterday and some 120 inmates were involved, taking one of the wings of the building and at least 12 hostages. Eight of them are police officers, who were unarmed, and the remaining hostages are construction workers doing repairs on the prison.

The first accounts state that the rioters displayed signs on the prison walls asking for "Reduced Sentences," "Justice and Freedom," "Viva Peronismo" and "Viva Radicalism."

At 1600 hours, it was reported that there was complete calm inside and outside the prison and that no acts of violence had occurred. At around 1715 hours, the provincial minister of government and justice, Dr Fernando Medina Alliana, arrived, along with the chief of police of Chaco, General Commissioner Sotero Cayo Alegre, members of his staff, the examining magistrate of the Sixth Court of Resistencia, Dr Luni Felipe Gentile, and other judges handling the cases of the rioters.

Negotiations then began with the rioters, who presented a petition very similar to that published by prisoners at the Olmos jail, which included: a request for reductions in sentences of 30 percent, modifications in certain articles of the Penal Code and the Code of Procedures, speedier trials, better treatment and improved living conditions.

After 2130 hours, the minister of government, the chief of police, Judge Gentile, authorities of the High Court of Justice and other members of the forum continued to negotiate inside the prison, apparently with the rioters. Finally, after 2300 hours, the situation was resolved when the demands of the rioters were read to the press inside the prison and after authorities had promised to handle the matter.

Salta

In the meantime, in Salta some 500 prisoners at the Villa Las Rosas provincial jail rebelled, making the same demands, but their attitude was completely peaceful and consisted of refusing to go to work in prison workshops for their daily routine.

Relatives said that the prisoners remained in their buildings, while the minister of government of the province temporarily in charge of the provincial Executive Branch, Roberto Diaz, said that he is analyzing the subject and will talk with members of the Supreme Court of Justice in order to determine how to speed up trials.

Contradictory Reports on Riots

Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 9 Nov 83 pp 23-24

[Excerpt] Yesterday, Dr Francisco de Duranona y Vedia, minister of government of Buenos Aires Province, repeated that the situation was normal inside the prison and that only one inmate had died during the trouble. He maintained that the death of the other inmate was due to asthma.

"I have asked the head of the Penitentiary Service to make every possible effort to take care of the relatives of the inmates in the best possible manner and with the greatest cordiality," he said.

However, despite the reiterated affirmations, the tense vigil of relatives and friends of the inmates continued yesterday in the area around the prison, awaiting news that did not come. The serious accusations continued to circulate and some insisted that over 100 have died.

The situation has reached such an extreme that the recently elected governor of Buenos Aires Province, Dr Alejandro Armendariz, yesterday sent a personal representative to the Olmos prison so make a direct and objective on-the-spot report on the condition of the prisoners. Dr Armendariz is said to have agreed to go personally to the penal institution if his envoy does not obtain satisfactory responses from authorities.

Human Rights

The different human rights organizations released a strong communique yesterday afternoon demanding: a public investigation and information on the current situation of prisoners; that, based on simple reasons of humanity, relatives of prisoners be informed of their situation, where they are and how they are; that judges in each case visit the penal units in order to verify the contents of point 1; that the lawyers of human rights organizations be authorized to visit places of detention in order to learn the situation of prisoners; and finally, proper treatment of prisoners, as established by the National Constitution.

For its part, the Department of Overall Solidary Action for the Prisoner, located at 2866 Pedro Ignacio Rivera, announced its repudiation of the "systematized practice of terror used by the dictatorship in society," and announced in a communique that that same repression is now implemented in penal institutions throughout the country, resulting in deaths and missing persons. "One example is what has happened at Olmos Prison."

SASID [expansion unknown], set up 2 years ago at Devoto Prison, demands a thorough investigation into what has occurred at the Olmos Prison and proper punishment of the guilty parties.

Torture

Marcos Di Caprio, radical leader and future secretary of justice of Buenos Aires, revealed yesterday that many Olmos inmates have told the courts that they are subjected to torture and mistreatment. He also demanded that prison authorities "be responsible in writing for a list of prisoners and their whereabouts so that we will not have a repeat of the 1973 riot, when the bodies of inmates continued to appear months afterwards." Di Caprio, who went to the prison yesterday at the request of the governor-elect, talked with Judge Piombo and said that "in this country, when a man is sentenced, a whole family is condemned to indigency." He continued: "I do not want to create false expectations or turn this into a political question. Our plans are to humanize the prison problem, prevent the trial of an event rather than of a person, as is now the case, and achieve basic reforms in trials."

Di Caprio said, following a visit to the Olmos prison two nights ago with Judge Piombo, that to date, "the list of injured prisoners totals 100" and that there are "only two deaths."

At a press conference, after informing the governor-elect, Dr Alejandro Armendariz, on his visit, he revealed that Judge Piombo is handling a case on "a specific report by one inmate who was subjected to mistreatment by 7 officers of the Penitentiary Service" and that "we know nothing about whether the torture and mistreatment continue at the prison."

Nobel Prize Winner Requests Visit

Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 9 Nov 83 p 24

[Text] Concerning the situation existing at the Olmos prison following the rebellion on the part of inmates the its subsequent quelling by police, Nobel Peace Prize winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel sent a telegram to the governor of Buenos Aires Province, Jorge Aguado, asking permission to enter the prison and requesting information on the condition of the prisoners.

In the note sent to the governor, Perez Esquivel condemns the "flagrant violations of human rights being committed at the Olmos prison" and asks permission for relatives of the inmates to enter the institution, immediate medical care for the prisoners who are wounded or in poor physical condition, and authorization for his own entry during the next 24 hours.

For its part, the Committee of Peronist Relatives of Prisoners and Missing Persons has demanded in a communique "that an investigation be conducted of all the events that have occurred at the prison unit, that the guilty parties be punished and that proper human attention be paid to prisoners physically affected by repression."

11,464

CSO: 3348/64

UCR'S VICTORY ATTRIBUTED TO NATION'S WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE

Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish 4 Nov 83 p 26

[Article by Oscar Camilion: "Polarization, But Not So Much"]

[Text] In his classic work, "The Political Parties," Maurice Duverger described with clearcut examples the close relationship that exists between the electoral law and the party system. He concluded that a majority electoral system, wherein the minorities lacked representation, tended toward the two-party system, and that a highly diversified proportional representation created conditions favorable to the multiparty system. Intermediate electoral systems tended toward types of political representation that were also intermediate.

Since social laws are not the same as those of physics, those tendencies have very noteworthy exceptions during transitional periods. For example, in Great Britain for some time the electoral system based on uninominal districts, giving representation only to the one who wins the election in each district, has not been reflected in a two-party system, but rather in the presence of a plurality of parties which, for reasons stemming from the type of composition in the districts, has given the Conservatives an absolute predominance in Parliament, with only 42 percent of the vote. The Labour Party, the Liberal Party and the new Social Democrats show a diversity of tendencies which still persist at present, despite the fact that it assures the victory of the main adversary.

In Argentina, we have just witnessed how an exactly opposite phenomenon is possible. The statute on political parties (remarkably benevolent for facilitating their organization) and the electoral law which set a rather low "level" for making the practice of proportional representation possible, have tended toward a strongly multiparty system, and even toward a fragmentation of the political forces. Nevertheless, the election results have shown such highly concentrated figures that they recall only the polarization that occurred in the country in February 1946.

Speculation has now arisen as to whether the "two-party system" is the reality and future of Argentine politics; a hypothesis that is apparently backed by the historical tendency of the Argentine people to confront one another on the basis

of antinomies. Nevertheless, the apparent polarization of 1983 is considerably different from the very genuine polarization of 1946. This time, there was no "polarization" regarding Peronism; in other words, there were not really two poles, but rather a remarkable "concentration" around Alfonsin, who was the personal protagonist in the election, and who succeeded in attracting to himself both those whom he motivated positively and those who voted against Peronism. The latter, in turn, while it did everything possible to repel many sectors that had backed it in the past but that retained a very negative memory of the last Justicialist administration, actually held a very good election. However, that election was very good for the Justicialist "party" and not for the "movement," which it always attempted to be in the past.

Consequently, it is obvious that Alfonsinism, as a phenomenon that has transcended the party's bounds to a considerable extent, convoked sectors which will be submitting fundamentally different demands. The basic force which brought Raul Alfonsin to victory is, of course, a rather extensive desire for change directed against a long state of affairs that has been prolonged in the country much longer than the last decade, marked primarily by various forms of violence and arbitrary action. The success that is to be expected to be accrued on the political level will not conceal the deepseated differences that exist concerning the economic and social future.

A genuinely bipartisan Argentina would require that the current concentration around the Radical Party be consolidated; that the Justicialist Party succeed in curbing its obvious centrifugal tendencies; that the Peronist and Radical government proposals be clearly differentiated; and also that there be complete success in the system. Since none of this is easy, the future projection of Sunday's dichotomy is by no means ensured.

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CSO: 3348/61

IMMINENT RETURN OF FIRMENICH PRODUCES UNCERTAINTY

Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish 2 Dec 83 pp 6-11

[Article by Tabare Areas, researched by Jorge Vidal, Eduardo Parise and Eduardo Basz]

[Text] Some 50 passengers were on the plane that arrived in Sao Paulo, Brazil from Bolivia on the cloudy afternoon of Friday 18 November. One of them, a tall, well-groomed man wearing sports clothes, was Mario Eduardo Firmenich. The Montonero chief had decided to return to public view in the Southern Cone by taking part in political gatherings. Firmenich encountered no problems at passport control (no one has yet learned where his passport was from) and was met in the arrival terminal by Paulo Schilling, the international public relations director of the Party of the Workers, a political movement headed by labor leader Luis Ignacio Da Silva, better known as Lula.

Firmenich was taken by car to the Samambaia Hotel, located downtown near the Plaza de la Republica; a room there costs \$17 a day. It was there that the terrorist chief had his headquarters during his stay in Sao Paulo. He had been invited by the Legislative Assembly of Sao Paulo to take part in the fourth meeting of "democratic and people's parties." The gathering was attended by representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador and Brazil.

The meeting, held in the state legislature building, was chaired by the Brazilian Neffiti Talles and lasted 3 days. Firmenich kept a low profile, and several participants later revealed that he was interested in everything that was being said, so much so that he preferred to have lunch in the legislative chamber (special ham and cheese sandwiches) rather than leave the building.

Everyone in the hall was obviously aware of the notoriety of the guest, and there was genuine interest in finding out what he had to say. Firmenich awaited his turn and spoke for 30 minutes. His remarks were taped by the Legislative Assembly.

Those who heard him said that he placed special emphasis on the following points:

--Maria Estela Martinez de Peron's government was a disaster.

--Peronism lost the recent elections because it was unable to adapt to Argentina's political and social changes.

--The democratic trend under way is very positive.

--Alfonsin will be successful only if he can mobilize the country around an economic model aimed at the domestic market.

He then spoke at length about the reasons why the Montonero Peronist Movement opted for the armed struggle and ignored the Peronist authorities. He spent less time, 10 minutes, explaining some of the group's "successes" and "failures" in its long career of violence and slayings. "Firmenich is a good speaker and left the hall amid applause," said one of the delegates to a Sao Paulo newsman. By that time there was no longer any doubt that Firmenich had begun his "approach pattern" to Argentina.

Troubled Waters

Various government circles in Buenos Aires regarded Firmenich's return as probable as long as 20 days ago, and they are obviously worried about it. Some circles linked to military intelligence are saying quietly that a campaign is already under way to set the stage for his likely arrival. It was not much of a surprise, then, that on Monday the 28th the nation learned the details of a presentment filed by attorney Fernando Torres with the courts. Torres, an old Peronist activist with links to the Metalworkers Union, filed a petition for a "preventive" habeas corpus to ascertain the legal status of the proceedings that were begun at various times against Mario Eduardo Firmenich, Fernando Vaca Narvaja, Roberto Cirilo Perdia, attorney Lucio Garzon Maceda and former governors Ricardo Obregon Cano (Cordoba) and Oscar Raul Bidegain (Buenos Aires).

More and more people began wondering: Is it possible that the Montonero chief can return freely to the country without having any unfinished business in court? The question was far from ingenuous and put more than one court on edge.

On 28 April 1980 Federal Judge Eduardo Marquardt ordered Firmenich placed in preventive custody for the use of a forged public document and the possession of a combat weapon. In February 1974 the Montonero chief was arrested on the street by officers from Station 32 for possession of a firearm (he was carrying a 9-millimeter Browning pistol that belonged to the Buenos Aires provincial police and a 38-millimeter Smith and Wesson revolver) and a police badge. Firmenich showed the police commission documents that identified him as Esteban Mario Lozigaray. He was released. On the trip to the police station he was said to have been accompanied by Dante Gullo. Judge Marquardt proceeded with the case and called upon him to testify, but Firmenich never showed up, and the judge thus ordered him arrested. The maximum penalty for that crime is 10 years in jail. Attorney Torres asked that the charges be dropped in view of the time that has passed.

It did not take long for researchers into court records to come up with another pending suit. In March 1982, Humberto Volando, the president of the Agrarian Federation, appeared before Criminal and Correctional Court No 3 to complain that he had received Montonero publications at his home. Judge Narvaiz drew up an indictment and granted a hearing to Prosecutor Oscar Mario Salvi, who was to succeed him a year later. Salvi asked that Firmenich be prosecuted on charges of certified illicit association and the publishing and dissemination of subversive literature. Under what law? Article 210 bis of the Penal Code and Article 2, Paragraphs a and b of Security Law 20,840. The judge granted the prosecutor's request, ordered Firmenich put on trial and issued the arrest order. Salvi, who is now the judge in that court, excused himself from the case because he had already voiced his opinion as prosecutor.

Court sources feel that Firmenich is in a difficult spot in this case because Salvi unleashed what is referred to colloquially as the "heavy artillery," that is to say, crimes for which a person cannot be released on bail, such as illicit association and violations of the Security Law. Therefore, if Firmenich returns to the country and wants to abide by existing law, he will have to surrender to the court. Otherwise, he will continue to be a fugitive from justice, jurists who are familiar with the case feel.

There is apparently another, much less well-known case, however, that illustrates how things were done during the first half of the 1970's. According to the account of a very reliable source, on 18 March 1974, a month after he was arrested at Station 32, Firmenich was arrested once again at a police station in Villa Martelli on charges of possessing a firearm and a forged document. The case was reportedly heard in San Martin federal court as No 25,511/74 and filed in docket 386. According to the source, 2 days after his arrest, a man named Ferreyra from the Buenos Aires provincial police arrived in Villa Martelli directly from La Plata. He allegedly asked the presiding judge to release Firmenich because of insufficient cause. The magistrate recorded the incident on page 19 of the file. In any event, the judge asked Firmenich to declare a legal domicile so that the proceedings could continue, and the Montonero leader gave Emilio Lamarca 558 in the Federal Capital. The magistrate summoned him again later; Firmenich failed to appear and thus became a fugitive from justice.

The Devil's Advocate

After the surprise triggered by the story that CLARIN published on Tuesday, many Argentines began wondering who this lawyer, Fernando Torres, was who had filed a habeas corpus petition for the exiled Montonero leader. To those who know him a bit, however, the story was not at all surprising. "If there is anyone capable of undertaking a task like that, it is Torres. His friendship with Obregon Cano and Bidegain and his constant work defending political prisoners made him an obvious choice," went the comments in the courthouse corridors.

Fernando Torres was born 60 years ago in San Isidro and received his law degree from the National University of La Plata in 1954. While he was studying, he was a Buenos Aires public employee during the Domongo Mercante administration, and he was an adviser to the Peronist Superior Council when the Liberating Revolution came along. His ties with Peronism go much further back, though. Originally a Radical, he was a member of Forja and, like so many others, joined Peronism from its outset. "I've been a Peronist since February 1946, when I voted for Peron. Before I was even 18 I was involved in Forja with Scalabrini Ortiz and Jauretche," he often recalls. In October 1955 he became Peronism's general agent and began defending political prisoners. His activities annoyed the de facto government, and along with the Radicals Belaustegui and Rojo he wound up in jail. The reason: defending John William Cooke, who was in prison in Ushuaia at the time. His colleague and friend Dr Gerardo Pagore Saulnier remembers those days: "I was his defense attorney. I remember his file in SIDE [Secretariat for State Intelligence]; it said: a staunch Peronist, extremely dangerous. That was right. Fernando is a staunch Peronist; the bit about being dangerous is the view of the intelligence secretariat. But those who know him know that he worships his profession. He was one of the few who had the courage to sign a habeas corpus petition after March 1976."

When Vandor took over the UOM [Metalworkers Union], Torres became an adviser and, at the same time, joined the legal team of the CGT [General Labor Confederation]. He was the defense attorney of most of the prisoners under the Conintes Plan during the Frondizi administration. This caused him problems: he was jailed and then exiled to Bolivia and Uruguay. He resumed his work in the CGT and UOM upon returning and was elected intendant of San Isidro in March 1962. During the Illia administration he defended the prisoners who had undertaken their Plan of Struggle against the government. When Peronism returned to power in 1973, he was named national director of the Labor Police, a post that he held until March 1976. Since then, besides serving as the UOM's attorney and a personal adviser to Lorenzo Miguel, he has devoted himself to defending people who have been arrested for political reasons or on charges of subversion.

Time to Return

The last photographs of Firmenich that Argentines remember are the ones that reporters took when they traveled to Managua in 1980 to cover the Sandinist revolution's assumption of power. There, among the hundreds of Nicaraguan guerrillas and activists appeared Firmenich and Vaca Narvaja, dressed in olive drab uniforms and, at times, carrying heavy weapons, making believe that they were involved in the "Sandinist people's struggle." Then came a lengthy silence, interrupted from time to time by a public statement in Europe and, of course, the flood of pamphlets arriving in Buenos Aires through various channels and pushing the Montonero program. His appearance in Sao Paulo takes on importance, therefore.

"Mario wants to return..." said Paulo Schilling after the 3-day meeting in Brazil. Schilling is an intellectual who lived for many years in Buenos Aires until President Joao Figueiredo decreed a political amnesty in his country. Those who saw him said that Firmenich appeared calm and that his hosts took him to dine at a steakhouse and a pizzeria in the Bexiga district, where Sao Paulo's large Italian colony is concentrated.

In any event, Schilling merely announced Firmenich's return and declined to go into detail. A young newswoman from a Sao Paulo morning daily succeeded in speaking briefly with the terrorist, who offered his views only on the political gathering being held there. He was heard to say this about Alfonsin, however: "If he does not succeed in mobilizing the country around an economic program aimed at the domestic market, the Armed Forces or a faction of them will attempt a coup within 2 years." After the meeting, Firmenich was out of sight for a while, which was interpreted as an opportunity to make a number of discreet political contacts. Very few people found out with whom the Montonero leader spoke, and none of them wanted to tell. Firmenich left Sao Paulo on Tuesday the 22nd, without making any statements or causing any commotion. No one knows or cares to say where he was headed.

The Armed Forces are seriously worried that he might show up somewhere in the country. Privately, the feeling in the military is that this could create a very touchy situation for the future government, but another much more complex possibility exists: that someone will kill Firmenich as soon as he is discovered to be in the country. The military feels that no matter what action the next government takes to dissolve paramilitary groups, there would be a long list of persons who would like to hunt down the terrorist chieftain. A ranking officer commented recently among friends: "Don't look at us. Many of the relatives and friends of the young people that Firmenich and his gang killed are after them too. No one says so, but they're after them..." Firmenich himself must realize this too.

Military circles are saying that if the Montonero chief returns when a full state of law is in effect, with the military tribunals dissolved, he will have to abide by the law like any other citizen, i.e. not carry weapons and travel without bodyguards. Under these conditions it is more than unlikely that Firmenich will show up in Argentina.

No one either inside or outside the military seriously thinks that Firmenich will return to Buenos Aires to take part in democratic politics, thereby renouncing his philosophy of violence and murder. No one, of course, believes his pledge that he will come to give "critical support to the democratic government that the people elected on 30 October."

A somewhat suspicious glance at the Argentine political scene reveals that Firmenich's almost natural base of support seems to be the Peronist Intransigence and Mobilization group, the radicalized wing

of justicialismo, the heir of the JP. Juan Carlos Dante Gullo is now an active member of this faction, although the fact is that no one can say for certain whether it does or does not have any sort of real contact with the Montonero organization overseas. This is, at least, more difficult to prove than to speculate about.

Other political circles and some military circles too have in recent days been entertaining the notion that a full-fledged political and judicial scheme was under way to whitewash Firmenich and the rest of the Montonero top echelon overseas, including Obregon Cano, Oscar Bidegain, Garzon Maceda and others. As a well-informed source told SOMOS, "it could happen that after some softening up work, Firmenich will appear in court or surrender to arrest under the guardianship of a judge. Since the charges pending are not that serious, he could, with a good defense, be released from jail promptly and, therefore, get off scot free. I think that some people are already at work on this..." Firmenich would then be in a position to return to the political struggle under the protection of the democratic system. How paradoxical, for this man is the personification of the antisystem, a preacher of violence, kidnapping and murder as methods of political action.

The Radical View

The Radical waters began to churn as soon as Torres filed the habeas corpus petition in behalf of Firmenich and Vaca Narvaja. In private government circles many are wondering what he is after. Was it a political feint to ascertain the future government's capacity to react? Or, on the contrary, was it the first legal step to permit the Montonero leaders to enter through Ezeiza Airport without snags?

Qualified spokesmen of the government-elect feel that the answer to this political question was provided by the president of the Chamber of Deputies himself: "If they (Firmenich and Vaca Narvaja) think that they're going to come back as heroes, they're wrong," said Juan Carlos Pugliese. And Antonio Troccoli added: "If they have cases pending in court or if prosecution proceedings are still under way against them, then the courts will ultimately have to determine the restrictions or limitations on their freedom."

Meanwhile, the affair made it all the way to Room 1802 of the Panamericano Hotel. There, Raul Alfonsin had reportedly been given a verbal account by his ministers. "The president is a man of the law, and therefore you can take it for granted that these cases will not be settled outside the courts," a spokesman told SOMOS.

There are other sides to a judicial settlement of the Firmenich and Vaca Narvaja cases ("There are other, less well-known individuals in a similar situation too," a Radical leader remarked). How will the Armed Forces react? In this regard, it was learned that Defense Minister Raul Borrás was worried. The future minister is not unaware that the mere mention of Firmenich and Vaca Narvaja causes even the

most moderate members of the Armed Forces to react violently. Nevertheless, both Borrás and Pugliese have reportedly reminded the military that the amnesty law would be repealed by the next National Congress, and "therefore, they will all have their day in court."

Sources close to the future defense minister did not rule out, however, that there is a major political element to the announcement of the subversive leaders' return to the country, the aim of which is to place hurdles on the road to democracy. "In this regard," they say, "some black hand is at work."

"They got tired of drinking tequila and French champagne and would now like to come back and destabilize things," a brand-new Radical senator angrily told SOMOS in commenting on the alleged return of the Montonero leaders. Other lawmakers were just as caustic, though pointing out that "the courts will have the decision-making power in these matters."

To those who are acquainted with legislative parlance, the interpretation was simple: "There will be no congressional committees to investigate acts of violence." Several congressmen were less categorical about the possibility of Penal Code reforms that would enable the country to combat violence more harshly. "Italy and Germany are examples of how to combat terrorism within the law and the courts. If the Executive Branch feels that the Penal Code ought to be amended, it will submit reforms to Congress," some lawmakers said out loud.

The Weight of the Law

After the tragic experience of the past decade, there are still many Argentines who wonder whether society (and the system that will take over as of 10 December) really has the necessary legal instruments to defend itself against terrorism. Some feel that only the faithful observance of existing legislation is necessary. Others say that our legislation is unable to cope successfully with the sophisticated methods of violence and concealment that characterize subversive activities or the mechanisms of the armed struggle to seize political power.

Former Appeals Court Judge Jorge Gonzalez Novillo has stated: "As the basic legislation now stands, I feel that with a few small touch-ups it can handle any renewed outbreak of subversion. What lacks effectiveness is the infrastructure system for trying crimes. I think, as the future interior minister said, that proceedings have to be more prompt, such as the oral proceeding, so that the punishment can be meted out rapidly. I believe in the creation of a judicial police and a special antisubversion corps, because the police is much more effective than the Armed Forces in preventing terrorist crimes."

Former Federal Judge Rafael Sarmiento believes exactly the opposite, thus illustrating the debate that is beginning to take shape within the nation's social fabric in the face of the possible arrival of

the terrorist chieftains. "From a procedural and legislative standpoint, we are not prepared to effectively repress another outbreak of subversion. Our experience tells us that our legislative instruments were inadequate because they are based on the erroneous assumption that a subversive is nothing more than a criminal. A subversive is actually, however, a soldier, a combatant who is carrying out a military and political strategy. A guerrilla's crime is not a simple crime; it is also an act of war. Murderers and thieves are at our border, and Argentina does not have the appropriate legislation to act in an emergency."

German Bidart Campos, a prestigious constitutional lawyer, feels differently: "I think that defending democracy does not require a tight closing of our borders to keep out the alleged enemies of democracy. I think that a democratic regime has to defend itself against terrorist aggression with all of its legislation, penal law included, as the future government's bills seem to suggest. If there is a renewed outbreak of subversion, the Armed Forces and the Security Forces, acting as arms of the civilian government and within the law, will be able to crack down on and neutralize it."

Every time that the issue is discussed, many look to Italy, a country that suffered almost as violent subversive aggression as Argentina but that employed different methods to defeat it. The usual comment is that the nation's judges, acting pursuant to appropriate legislation and with security forces subordinate to the courts, were mainly responsible for defeating the Red Brigades. Nevertheless, a major debate still rages among the Italian people today about one of the upshots of the struggle against the terrorists: the repentant terrorists law.

The debate is over how to reconcile the horror caused by so many crimes with the application of a law that enables many murderers to go free if they merely collaborate with law-enforcement agencies by giving them information on subversives still at large. The legislation on repentant terrorists was passed in the midst of a terrorist offensive, at the request of Gen Carlo Dalla Chiesa, who was in charge of the crackdown on subversion. This was in 1980, when Italy had not yet recovered from the severe trauma caused by the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro.

In any event, such an eventuality still seems far off to Argentines, and the debate will continue. But what does not seem all that far off is the possibility that people who sowed terror and death and sent many youths to their grave by lining them up behind a spurious political and party flag, will return to the country. Our tragic experience must not be forgotten amid a parochial debate in which how to punish the outgoing military officers is the only topic, because while the people are taking to the streets to celebrate the long-sought return to democracy, the wild-eyed proponents of violence could well be sneaking in under cover of the joyous festivities.

FORECASTS FOR 1984 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, PROFITS FAVORABLE

Soybean Prospects

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 28 Oct 83 p 22

[Text] If there are no negative weather phenomena, the next soybean crop may go down in history as marking a record year in Brazilian agriculture. Recent trends on the foreign market have been instilling great enthusiasm in national producers, who glimpse possibilities for a profitable harvest.

The factors working together in a positive direction to create this situation are centered on the failure of the U.S. crop, combined with the various programs for reducing acreage that have affected soybeans indirectly. Moreover, the data on stockpiles confirm a situation of inadequate supplies during 1984. The latest figure released by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) indicates an initial supply of 10,524,000 tons. Of that total, it is estimated that the producers are holding back 4.07 million tons in hope of getting a better price. Demand will probably be low, since quotations are expected to go above about \$10 per bushel. The USDA therefore projects a consumption of 50.08 million tons with a surplus for stockpiling totaling 4.08 million tons, according to data included in a recent report by the brokerage firm of Increment Commodities.

It will be extremely important for Brazil to take advantage of this situation so as to increase its scope for exports in this highly competitive market. Whence the imperative need also to decide now concerning a policy for marketing the next harvest so as to ensure domestic supplies first of all and thus avoid the imports which were necessary this year.

Another factor to be taken into account concerns Brazilian soybean yields. According to data supplied by the IBGE [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics], yields averaging 1,789 kilograms per hectare have been achieved--the highest figure for the past 6 years--but that is still far from the levels achieved in the United States, where the yield is generally between 2,180 and 2,240 kilograms per hectare. Next year is also the year when the effects of the Central Bank's controversial Circular No 706 will begin to make themselves felt. As will be recalled, that circular freed producers of the requirement that they use inspected seed in order to qualify for subsidized financing. This favors a wider use of the producer's own seed, the germination power of which is frequently less. A parallel effect was to discourage production of

the better-quality input. That, combined with weather problems, jeopardized supplies, and seed prices floated up to unbearable levels. Only producers who had been able to market their crop when prices were high were able to adopt the better-quality input.

Basically, the greatest hope lies in increasing the area planted. In the "youngest" states, such as Mato Grosso, there may be increases of up to 50 percent in the area planted and excellent yields in the neighborhood of 2,100 kilograms per hectare--that is, well above the national average. The 1983-1984 forecast issued by the Sao Paulo Secretariat of Agriculture predicts that the planted area in that state will increase by 13.8 percent, with the same being true--although on a smaller scale--in the states in the South Region. It should be realized that many farmers are choosing soybeans because of the lack of a better alternative. This means that new increases in yields may be obtained, but only with difficulty. In the opinion of AGROANALYSIS, which is a publication of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, a national harvest on the order of 15 million tons can be expected. That is a much more pessimistic figure than those being projected, for example, by the vegetable oil industry. In short, the prospects are good in terms of foreign exchange earnings, production, and area planted. It remains for us to hope that domestic consumer prices will show the stability that has been lacking since last August.

Prospect of Good Prices Encourages Planting

Sao Paulo ISTOE in Portuguese 26 Oct 83 pp 34-36, 38

[Article by Genilson Cezar and Delmar Marques]

[Text] Porto Alegre--A sweet taste of celebration is spreading among the country's farmers. Having just emerged from two moderate agricultural seasons and caught up in uncertainties and deficient earnings, they are starting to plant on the broad plains of the South, on the gentle hills of Parana, in the interior of Sao Paulo, or in the wide woodland savannas of the Center-West, and they are drenched in euphoria: they are all betting that the next harvest will be one of the best in recent years. That is a rare favorable prospect in the sea of bad news flooding the country. All by themselves, five of the most important crops--corn, soybeans, rice, beans, and cotton--are going to push Brazilian grain production to 51.3 million tons in 1984--a comforting sign of convalescence in a sector that suffered a drop of 6 million tons last year. This promising harvest--13 percent higher than that expected from this year's crop--is going to cause a larger green splotch on the agricultural map of Brazil: the planted area will increase by no less than 1.1 million hectares. The heavyweights in this expansion will be soybeans and corn, especially the latter, which may bring the Federal Government extremely desirable dollars from the international market. Projections by the Ministry of Agriculture suggest that corn production will rise by 12 percent and that soybean production will be up by 5 percent, for a total of 21.9 million tons of corn and 15.3 million tons of soybeans. This still may not constitute a turnaround, especially since soybeans, even if their production rises, will not provide enough for exports, and cotton production as a whole is going to shrink and cause complications for the textile industry. But the recovery will be a good one in a country which, in less bitter times, was regarded as basically agricultural.

The euphoria of the farmers is not unjustified. "The best input for agriculture is price," says Reynaldo Rehder Ferreira, superintendent of the Maringa Coffeegrowers Cooperative (COCAMAR), which represents 20,000 agricultural producers in 80 towns in northern Parana--the state that is Brazil's big granary. Ferreira says: "The farmers are more excited this year. They are expecting bigger profits from the next harvest." And in fact, prices are higher for almost all farm products--the minimum compensation set by the government is higher than the inflation rate--while the failure of the last harvest and the collapse of the American grain crop have brought prices for some products to astronomical levels abroad. The price of a sack of corn, for example, rose by 614 percent in 1 year (from 1,400 to 10,000 cruzeiros by September), while the price of soybeans did even better. It hit a high of 17,000 cruzeiros per sack, setting a historical record of 640 percent in 12 months.

The result of those figures is the expected expansion in planted area. In the region of Cascavel in southwestern Parana, where 15 percent (700,000 tons) of the nation's entire soybean production is concentrated, the area planted in soybeans will increase by 4.5 percent: from 311,000 hectares in the last harvest to 325,000 hectares. "The farmers want to plant everywhere they can," says Bento Tolentino, chief agronomist at the state Secretariat of Agriculture's regional office in Cascavel. Even the high price of land is not inhibiting this onslaught by the producers. In Cascavel, an alqueire [1 alqueire = 24,200 square meters] ready for planting now costs an average of 1.5 million cruzeiros, or almost 50 percent more than last June.

But many producers have acquired cheaper land that is still covered by virgin forest. The Madeireira Industrial Company alone--one of the region's large soybean producers--has sold between 1,500 and 2,000 hectares of land to small and medium-sized producers in Cascavel in recent months. Other farmers have leased land once used as pasture. One of them is 36-year-old Francisco Salvati of Rio Grande do Sul. The father of two, he produces soybeans in the Melissa district 18 kilometers from Cascavel. Salvati began planting soybeans in 1972 on 10 alqueires. He recalls: "I had a team of oxen and a piece of land." Today his property totals close to 90 hectares, two-thirds of it leased. Salvati makes the lease payments with 20 percent of his production from that land.

But the results make it worthwhile. Salvati expects to harvest 5,000 sacks of soybeans in the next season, and even if he sold them today at the minimum price set by the government (4,800 cruzeiros per sack), he would have a profit of 4 million cruzeiros. But he expects to do much better. Some producers in the community of Melissa are already signing contracts for delivery in May at a price of 25,000 cruzeiros--five times as much as last May. Salvati asserts: "That is still too cheap. I'm not going to sell until I have my production in May." His confidence is based on his good experience in recent years: after starting out with the team of oxen in 1972, Salvati bought a small 49-hp tractor 3 years later. He now has two Ford tractors and a New Holland reaper. He bought the reaper in 1977 for 33 million cruzeiros, and it is now worth over 100 million. In addition, he used 10 million cruzeiros to exchange his old stone cottage for a large brick house at the entrance to his property.

Prospects for Recovery in Agriculture
This year's harvest and next year's forecast in 1,000's of tons

Item	1982-1983 Crop	1983-1984 Crop
Cotton	611	661
Rice	8,000	10,700
Beans	1,800	2,800
Corn	19,600	21,900
Soybeans	14,600	15,300

Source: Ministry of Agriculture

The benefits are greater for someone who has more land. As a result of the 2-percent increase represented by the production of 390,000 tons of soybeans on the area planted by its members (170,000 hectares), COCAMAR expects to double last year's billings of 28 billion cruzeiros. Rehder Ferreira, the cooperative's superintendent, says: "We are really expanding." The group invested 1.2 billion cruzeiros this year to increase soybean storage capacity for its members by 100,000 tons--to which it has now added 45,000 square meters leased from the IBC (Brazilian Coffee Institute). The momentum is also being reflected in other investments by the group: for setting up a soybean oil refinery in Maringa and a silk spinning mill in Alto Parana, a town in the state's "new north."

The hope of good results from the next harvest also shows in urban activities. "Here everybody has a chance to make money," declares Dilson Alves Bello, manager of the Bank of Brazil branch in Cascavel, which serves five municipalities in the southwestern region. He says there is a great demand for money in the city because of the expectations created by the escalation of soybean and corn prices. Half of the financing for farmers in Cascavel has already been granted by the private banks--a phenomenon that has not been occurring in recent years. The fever has spread to businesses dealing in machinery, seed, fertilizer, and herbicides, which are now operating at the same pace as the farmers. In Sao Paulo, last May's bulletin from ANFAVEA (National Association of Automotive Vehicle Manufacturers) announced a sudden and promising rise in tractor sales. In 9 months, 17,600 units, including tracked and wheeled tractors and motorized cultivators, had been sold--enough to make the industry believe that it can now reduce its idle capacity, currently estimated at 80 percent. It has all the more reason to think so now, considering the Federal Government's decision at the end of September to release \$300 million through PROINVEST to finance farm machinery and inputs. In Cascavel, orders for new tractors are already averaging 20 units per month.

For some producers, earnings from their planting will be enough to cover all their investments at once. Farmer Raul Muller, 37, replaced 5 tractors out of his fleet of 13 vehicles this year so that he could cultivate almost 3,000 hectares in Rio Grande do Sul. From about 600 hectares scattered around in various parcels from Panambi to Pantano Grande in the southern part of the state, Muller expects to harvest 2,300 kilograms of wheat per hectare--an admirable performance compared to the 400 kilograms per hectare recorded as the national average in the last harvest. Muller is preparing a total of 1,900 hectares for soybean

planting this summer--300 more than in his last season--being encouraged to do so by the price for that product in this second half of the year.

Naturally, those attractions do not mean that planting for the next crop is taking place without problems. The greater interest in fertilizers, pesticides, and seed has resulted in an unrestrained increase in the price of those products and, in some cases, a complete shortage. Soybean seed, for example, rose from 4,000 cruzeiros per bag in 1982 to 50,000 cruzeiros this year, causing the burgeoning of an unusual parallel market in seed. Moreover, the shortage is leading many producers to switch permanently to corn, since production costs are lower than they are for soybeans and the outlook for sales on the international market has improved as a result of this year's crop failure in the United States--the consequence of a severe drought in that country.

In some regions, the progress by soybeans and corn in the makeup of national food production will cause traumas. For example, traditional bean producers in the municipality of Itarare, the main producing area in Sao Paulo 300 kilometers from the capital, are gradually switching to corn production. Throughout the state there will be a 15-percent reduction in the area planted in that pillar of the national diet. The area planted in beans currently totals 310,000 hectares, according to a preliminary survey by the Secretariat of Agriculture. "It no longer pays to stick to beans," complains Jose Ferreira dos Santos, 40, of Sao Paulo, who with three brothers farms 80 alqueires of land 15 kilometers from Itarare. Discouraged by losses in the last harvest, the Santos brothers decided to change tactics: they have set aside 40 percent of their land for corn in the upcoming 1983-1984 season. The average yield per alqueire is favorable to corn, say the farmers, and production costs are lower than they are for beans. But certainly not as much as the farmers hope in terms of opportunity. Planting an alqueire of corn in the Itarare region is not possible today for less than 500,000 cruzeiros. To finance the 15 alqueires for which he is responsible, Jose Ferreira had to borrow 4 million cruzeiros from the bank six times at an interest rate of 10 percent per month. He says: "I couldn't even think of buying a new tractor (of up to 65hp at an average cost of 10 million cruzeiros), because I would be paying interest for a long time."

If the escalation of soybean and corn planting is bad for beans--some people even say there will be a shortage next year--things are even worse for cotton. Experts at the Parana Secretariat of Agriculture estimate that the area planted in cotton will drop by 16 percent throughout the state. Solely in the Maringa region, which produced 5 million arrobas [1 arroba = 15 kilograms] in the last harvest, the cotton harvest is expected to drop by 30 percent. That decline will undoubtedly lead to higher prices for textile products. "The government is encouraging the planting of soybeans and corn, but forgetting other important products," says agronomist Bento Tolentino, an expert for the Secretariat of Agriculture in Cascavel. Tolentino believes that in addition to textile products, many products of vital importance--soybean oil and meal, animal feed, eggs, chicken, lard, and other items--will continue to experience large price increases in 1984.

This new rush into soybeans and corn is leaving marks on the life of rural workers. Since their harvesting is now considerably mechanized, soybeans and

corn do not require much manpower. An average-sized ranch of 100 alqueires has a maximum of two or three permanent employees and hires another 10 or 12 employees by the day--the itinerant workers, who earn between 800 and 1,000 cruzeiros per day during the harvest season, when they work. Francisco Salvati, a soybean producer in the Melissa district, says: "The labor union is to blame for that situation." According to him, many producers could hire a lot more workers, but they don't dare call them in for fear of complications with the labor courts. Salvati says: "The union keeps defending labor laws without much concern for the rural area." And the result is an increase in the number of unemployed. In the Cascavel region alone, where just over 150,000 people live, the unemployed contingent totals 10,000, and 4,000 of those are itinerant workers. Many of them are small producers--people who once cleared virgin forest and were driven off their land by the new crops, but who still hope to conquer new areas. "All we ask is a little bit of land to farm on," says Carlos Saldanha, 38, of Parana, who has seven children. He was once a farmer but is now an itinerant worker. For 2 months, he has been camping with 53 other farm families at a road junction near Cascavel. For 3 years they had been occupying 300 alqueires on the Three Pines Ranch near there, but they were evicted by police last 4 August under a court order. Saldanha says: "Now we are living in the hope that someone will bring us a little food. But we are tired of hoping. The solution is for us to get a little land somewhere else." That is the other, much less cheerful side of this new euphoria in the countryside.

11798

CSO: 3342/23

CHAVES' DISSATISFACTION WITH SUCCESSION PROCESS VIEWED

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 11 Nov 83 p 3

[Excerpt] Aureliano Chaves is not satisfied with the course of the succession process. Although he is expected to wait until at least the end of his upcoming passage through the Presidential Palace, from the 15 to the 21 of this month when he will be standing in for General Joao Figueiredo, who will be travelling to Africa, he has not made his views public. The last time he returned the power to the president, the vice-president declared that he returned the constitutional powers with humility and with his eyes turned towards the nation. His words need to be studied in depth to understand his dissatisfaction.

With humility because, in those days, he was being maliciously accused of having governed with efficiency and dynamism, contrasting with the marasmus that marked the previous actions of the chief executive. Among other reasons, the fact that Figueiredo was sick and had to undergo a saphenous bypass operation affected his remarks. At that time, Aureliano Chaves tried to solve mysteries and overcome sullenness, and if he did not achieve this, it was because of the blitz developed by presidential aides who were more interested in keeping the president incompatible with his substitute. On the other hand, he said he would remain with his eyes on the nation. It was advice and a warning, later solidified with an "opening of the heart" at the airport in Belo Horizonte where he stressed that when dealing with the matter of succession, Figueiredo should not limit his meetings and conversations to the Social Democratic Party (PDS). All society needed to be heard, and if this did not happen, he would have the right to disagree and to take the necessary steps in each individual case. One day later, at his farm in Tres Pontas, he was called to Brasilia by the president who told him of his decision to hear from diverse segments of the population, and not only those of his own party.

Happy at the time, Aureliano Chaves now sees the time pass and his coordinating work seemingly reach the end without his expectations becoming realities. This is why he is dissatisfied. Figueiredo listened to governors, leaders, members of congress and presidents of regional sections of the PDS, but if he consulted the public, nobody knows about it; nobody saw it. At most he exchanged comments with one or another businessman, but without ordering that phase of the investigation. No class organization, through its representatives, has been able to give an opinion and make suggestions or present successful positions on a matter.

It has been announced, but not confirmed, that when he returns from his African tour, the president will make the last adjustments to his coordinating work, even though he might be confusing interlocutors. To some, he talks of announcing the official candidate in December; to others in January, and to still others in March. Yet he does not make any indications as to the opening of dialogue with the people. His biggest concern is still that of stopping the plans of Paulo Maluf, but he does this within the PDS.

The result, according to people close to him and of his confidence, is that Aureliano Chaves does not like what is going on. He will not commit any precipitate act, because Figueiredo could very well start listening to the people from one day to the next without being enticed into it. Furthermore, if the vice president were to be surprised with a decision limited to the PDS, he would react, even if he had participated in the decision earlier.

What can he do in that case? With his natural climb to the presidency within the PDS blocked, would he have the political conditions to change and receive the support of the opposition candidates and be named their candidate? The law does not allow that to happen. If the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the Democratic Worker's Party (PDT) and the Worker's Party (PT) decide to launch candidates, they need to be included in their lists at least two years before the electoral college convenes on 15 January 1985. He will admit, however, to siding with an opposition candidate, whom he would support with his PDS support and backers, which could defeat the actions initiated by the government. It would not be easy because it would be very difficult for the vice president to endorse names such as Leonel Brizola and Ulysses Guimaraes, who would most probably be chosen by the PDT and the PMDB. But would he have, in this hypothetical case, the power to influence the PMDB, for example, to name Tancredo Neves and not the current president? In this case, his support would be more practicable.

There are those who don't think Aureliano Chaves would take such a contested stand, and leave him but one alternative: that of going home. This position, which he theoretically came up with long before the beginning of the electoral process, involves other considerations. He considers his political career complete.

He was a state representative, a secretary of state, a federal representative, a governor and the vice president of the country. To be president, he said, would be a lot, and would depend on uncountable factors; of the people's support of the political system and the possibility of carrying out a defined program. If not, he would take the alternative of private life.

This could be his response, fixed in clear terms of reaction and nonconformity. Because of his temperament and style, if the actions of General Joao Figueiredo go no further than the PDS, Aureliano Chaves would not let things pass, but would spread his feelings throughout society.

IBGE STUDY SHOWS INCREASING IMPOVERISHMENT OF POPULATION

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 12 Nov 83 p 3

[Text] The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) has just released the results of the National Poll on Housing Samples (PNAD) for 1982. They showed that the Brazilian population has gotten significantly more impoverished since the onset of the recession in 1981. They show the somber view of a nation whose trajectory shows a giddy fall of consequential proportions, due to the phenomenon of poverty.

Last year, the economically active population of Brazil (individuals 15 years old or older) numbered 46,928,800, or 38 percent of the total population. It is important to note that this figure includes the unemployment (those who have lost their jobs or are seeking one), which last year numbered 1,834,000. This figure, however, was lower than the previous year (1,892,000), when the decline of industrial production was higher.

However, it is worth noting that under-employment is increasing. People earning the minimum wage or less are included in the study. In 1982, 10 million people earned half the minimum wage or less. In 1981 there were 7.5 million people in this category. From these figures, it can be seen that poverty has increased substantially in a single year, creating a serious problem in a country where even the minimum wage does not offer subsistence.

Included in these 10 million people are children aged 10 or more, who, according to the adopted criteria, are not part of the economically active population, which only includes persons aged 15 or more. In this case, however, the situation is evolving in a very negative fashion. Looking at the economically active population earning the minimum wage or less, in 1970 this figure represented 60.54 percent of the total population, which at the time showed a social situation that was quite deprived and characterized the under-development of the country.

In 1980 the situation was quite different. Members of the economically active population earning the minimum wage or less represented 34.2 percent of the total. Because of the wage law of 1979, which allowed quarterly adjustments of 10 percent over the National Consumer Price Index (INPC), the participation of the salaried workers earning the minimum wage or less decreased; even in 1981, when it fell to 32.16 percent. Thus, it could be said that the redistributive

action of the law was being exercised. However, it was only an illusion, since said law, which apparently was generous, in fact favored unemployment and rotated manual labor. It can be verified that in 1982 the number of persons with earnings of the minimum wage or less climbed to 40.85 percent, which represents a sharp increase in poverty in a single year.

The government, sensitive to accusations of leftist economists, tried to reduce the concentration of earnings and to flatten the escalation of salaries through the wage law of 1979. It was successful for in 1980 and 1981, persons earning the equivalent of 20 times the minimum wage or more represented 1.52 percent of the total. In 1982, these represented 0.89 percent of the total. Meanwhile, as to flattening the wage scale, it can be noted that far from improving the situation of low income persons, it favored, in the opposite sense, poverty in general. There are reasons for fearing that with Law-Decree No 2065, which further accentuates the wage scale, the recessionist tendencies are being strengthened, restricting the buying power of the middle class.

The data furnished by the IBGE show a bleak picture. In the first place, we are seeing in the abolition of the middle class, which has been built up through tremendous difficulties and was contributing to the elevation of the standard of living of the Brazilian population as a whole. In 1981, persons earning the equivalent of five times the minimum wage or more represented 13.02 percent of the economically active population. A year later, that percentage fell to 10.29, which shows an extremely rapid process of decomposition of the middle class, whose existence, nevertheless, is a guarantee of democracy.

There is a more dramatic fact that has to be noted. The economically active population is becoming more proletarian, due to the fact that 40.85 percent of the population earns the minimum wage or less. We cannot keep from noting that this signifies a gloomy future for the Brazilian people. The truth is that the minimum wage does not allow for the adequate maintenance of a family. If the family income starts to depend on one worker earning the minimum wage because of increased unemployment, there is no doubt that the children of that family will grow up undernourished. That is to say that their physical and mental health will be compromised. Brazil is following in the footprints of India.

The above-mentioned data has to be analyzed and thought about by those defending a demagogical wage policy as well as those concluding that flattening the wage scale favors the proper distribution of income. Until now, the flattening of the wage scale only promotes general poverty, for which the IMF is not responsible.

12402

CSO: 3342/26

BRIEFS

TRADE TALKS WITH POLAND--The Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Andrzej Torosz, arrived in Brazil yesterday, heading a high-level delegation which will meet with a Brazilian delegation headed by Secretary-General Mailson Ferreira of the Ministry of Farming. The 3-day meeting will center on economic-trade interchange between the two countries. It is speculated that the matter to be discussed is the renegotiation of a U.S.\$1.6 billion debt Poland has with Brazil. However, according to a high-level source in the government, at Brazil's request, the topics will not revolve around ground rules. According to the same source, Brazil expects to include the Polish debt in the negotiations to be initiated soon between Brazilian economic officials and the Clube de Paris (Paris Club). According to the same source, the dialogue between the 2 commissions will encompass several aspects of bilateral trade between the 2 countries including an agreement for supplying Polish coal and sulphur as well as the sale of Brazilian iron ore. The Polish delegation includes Boguslaw Kott, a director of the Ministry of Finance, Roman Mlyniec, a commercial advisor from the Polish Embassy in Brazil, and Kazimir Krawcxynsk, a representative of the Polish Central Bank. On the Brazilian side, in addition to Mailson Nobrega, the delegation includes Minister Rubens Barbosa, head of the Eastern European Commission of Itamaraty, and representatives from the Foreign Trade Department (CACEX) and the Central Bank. [Excerpt] [Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 8 Nov 83 p 4] 12402

CSO: 3342/26

ACTIVITIES TO BE HELD IN HONOR OF REVOLUTION ANNIVERSARY

Havana TRIBUNA DE LA HABANA in Spanish 4 Oct 83 p 1

[Article by Agnerys Sotolonge]

[Text] Antonio Perez Herrero, alternate member of the Politburo and a member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Cuba, has chaired a meeting during which general guidelines were given to the radio and print press for broad news coverage of the activities to be held in honor of the 25th Anniversary of the Victory of the Revolution, which will take place from 2 December to 1 January.

Also present at the meeting, which was held at the headquarters of the Central Committee, was Orlando Fundora, alternate member of the top party organization and head of the Revolutionary Orientation Department. There was also a report on the favorable results of the day honoring the 30th Anniversary of the Moncada, which led to a vigorous movement toward attainment of important economic, political and social objectives.

Perez Herrero explained that during the period of the celebration outstanding worker collectives will be honored. Those which are to receive achievement awards will be given the corresponding honors during ceremonies recognizing their accomplishments. Also social works will be inaugurated, the opening of which will benefit the community.

Towns and cities liberated by the Rebel Army, which are reaching the 25th anniversary of those historic events, will also hold celebrations of diverse character. The families of heroes, martyrs and internationalist workers who have completed or are completing missions will also receive the warm homage of society for their transcendental efforts at the same time.

There will also be reaffirmation of the strength of our process and its irreversibility during various patriotic military activities which will be held and which will have as their site historical places, monuments and other localities that are related to the revolution. Pioneers, students and workers will enthusiastically join in these activities.

Another purpose of the commemorative activities will be the 30th anniversary of "History will absolve me" (which falls on 16 October), and special

ceremonies will be held to celebrate the establishment of history rooms in work centers. There will also be ceremonies honoring new members of worker collectives.

There will also be solemn commemoration of the anniversaries coming due between 2 December (anniversary of the Revolutionary Armed Forces) and the Day of National Liberation. Schools, public buildings and other structures will be decorated, and the Union of Young Communists will offer a substantial program, which will serve to demonstrate the loyalty of the younger generation to the revolution.

The meeting was also attended by Victor Manuel Gonzalez and Oscar Domenech, deputy directors of the Revolutionary Orientation Department, editors of press organs and representatives from the mass organizations and the Union of Young Communists.

8143

CSO: 3248/188

BRIEFS

NEW SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL MEMBERS--(AIN)--The composition of the new Superior Scientific Council of the Academy of Sciences of Cuba was reported during a meeting at the headquarters of this institution. Jose R. Fernandez, vice president of the Council of Ministers and a member of the party Central Committee was present. With a view to balancing the composition of the various sections and the number of its members, increasing the participation of highly qualified specialists from other organizations and assuring the greater presence of the most pertinent disciplines in its current work, the Scientific Council has been renewed and expanded. At present, the Council has 106 members. Of the 79 members of which it was previously composed, 43 have been ratified, 3 have died and the remaining members are new appointees. The members of the presidium of the Superior Scientific Council are: Dr Wilfredo Torres, of the Party Central Committee, president; Miguel Urrutia, alternate; Orlando Olivera, secretary; and seven other members. Later in the proceedings, the secretary of the new Superior Scientific Council reported on the auxiliary committees and their composition. He submitted for the approval of the plenum the proposed work program up to the end of 1984, which included analysis and renewal by each of the council's sections of the principal state problems and of basic research, preparation of the work guidelines of the committees and the upcoming meeting in 1984. [Text] [Havana JUVENTUD REBELDE in Spanish 16 Oct 83 p 2] 8143

CSO: 3248/188

IMF MEASURES TO STABILIZE ECONOMY ANNOUNCED

Interest on Savings

Guayaquil EL UNIVERSO in Spanish 19 Oct 83 p 1

[Text] Quito--In yesterday's session, the Monetary Board decided that beginning in 1984, prior deposits on imports will be eliminated to correct liquidity problems in the financial system. It also increased the interest rates to be paid by financial institutions on savings and term deposits from 15 to 16 percent and the interest rate on loan operations to 19 percent.

A communique issued by the Monetary Board at the conclusion of its regular weekly meeting on Tuesday announces the following measures:

1. It has authorized the Central Bank of Ecuador to participate in the financial mechanism for the recovery of firms and defense of labor, which, by relying on participation by the entire national financial system, will seek to assist and support firms of high social and economic priority which are facing temporary liquidity problems and which demonstrate that they have real prospects for recovery.

An executive committee has been established as part of the mechanism for the recovery of firms and defense of labor. It is headed by the minister of industries, commerce, and integration and consists of the general manager of the Central Bank, the manager of the National Financing Corporation, a representative of the lending banks, and a representative of the lending finance companies.

2. The Monetary Board has approved the requirements for refinancing public and private foreign debts to governments and suppliers through the Paris Club.

3. Continuing its implementation of the stabilization program, the Monetary Board has reorganized, simplified, and rationalized the system of interest rates, setting the minimum interest rate on savings and term deposits in all of the country's banking and financial institutions at 16 percent per annum and the maximum interest rate on all loan operations at 19 percent per annum.

4. The Monetary Board has also authorized payment of 10 percent of the value of such traditional exports as bananas, cocoa, and green coffee as quoted on the Central Bank's open market, thus confirming its willingness to continue a suitable promotion of exports.

5. A process of reducing prior deposits on imports will be started in order to reduce the purchasing cost of goods brought into the country.

Effective on 1 November, imports on list 1, segment B will require a prior deposit of 10 percent, while those on list 2 will require a prior deposit of 25 percent. This represents a 50-percent reduction in the amount of such deposits in comparison with the percentages in effect previously.

Effective on 1 January 1984, the requirement for a prior deposit on all imports brought into the country will be eliminated, thus correcting the liquidity problem being faced by the financial system and the business sector by freeing up funds estimated at between 600 and 700 million sucres monthly.

IMF Measures

Quayaquil EL UNIVERSO in Spanish 19 Oct 83 p 3

[Communique from the Monetary Board]

[Text] In yesterday's session, the Monetary Board analyzed the country's general economic situation and reached a number of decisions aimed at strengthening the economic stabilization program.

Measures Approved

To achieve that objective, it approved the following measures:

1. It authorized the Central Bank of Ecuador to participate in the financial mechanism for the recovery of firms and defense of labor, which, by relying on participation by the entire national financial system, will seek to assist and support firms of high social and economic priority which are facing temporary liquidity problems and which demonstrate that they have real prospects for recovery.

For that purpose, the Central Bank may discount or rediscount for financial institutions credit documents originating in the respective recovery programs. As part of its annual credit scheduling, it will set aside the amounts and lines of credit required for that purpose.

As part of the mechanism for the recovery of firms and defense of labor, an executive committee has been established under the chairmanship of the minister of industries, commerce, and integration. It consists of the general manager of the Central Bank, the manager of the National Financing Corporation, a representative of the lending banks, and a representative of the lending finance companies.

Firms wishing to avail themselves of this mechanism must submit their financial statements, payroll lists, the recovery program they have prepared, and an agreement by their creditors to comply with the recovery program being submitted to the executive committee.

The technical group that will analyze the recovery of the firms will consist of officials from the National Financing Corporation and the lending institutions.

The purpose of this mechanism is to stabilize that part of the production apparatus which is facing financial difficulties and thus maintain employment levels.

Refinancing Requirements

2. The Monetary Board has approved the requirements for refinancing public and private foreign debts to governments and suppliers through the Paris Club.

Interest Rate: 16 Percent

3. Continuing its implementation of the stabilization program, the Monetary Board has reorganized, simplified, and rationalized the system of interest rates, setting the minimum interest rate on savings and term deposits in all of the country's banking and financial institutions at 16 percent per annum and the maximum interest rate on all loan operations at 19 percent per annum.

In this connection, the Monetary Board's regulation authorizes the national financial system to establish, within that range, the rates to be paid to savers and those to be paid by persons seeking credit within the country.

It has exempted from that rule all preferential operations by the banks and financial institutions that are carried out through the mechanism of financing funds, the export promotion fund, the issue of development bonds, and stabilization loans.

In this latter case, the maximum rate will be 16 percent per annum, to which a commission of up to 2 percent annually in the case of loans for a term of more than 2 years may be added.

For the purpose of safeguarding economic recovery by the production sector, the Monetary Board has left the interest rate on stabilization loans unchanged in order to avoid increased costs in the program for the recovery of national production.

By means of that measure, an attempt is being made to encourage national savings by improving the yield from savings deposits accepted by the national financial system and safeguarding, to the extent possible, the economic and financial stability of Ecuador's production apparatus.

It also is in keeping with the economic policy outlines contained in the country's economic stabilization program.

Ten Percent of Export Value

4. The Monetary Board has also approved payment of 10 percent of the value of such traditional exports as bananas, cocoa, and green coffee as quoted on the Central Bank's open market, thus confirming its willingness to continue a suitable promotion of exports.

At the same time, it has transferred to import list II a number of items previously included on list I.

The amount represented by those items totals \$38.7 million, which, considered from the standpoint of imports as a whole, accounts for less than 3 percent of the country's total annual imports.

This is an important measure, since it confirms the steering of the stabilization program's economic policy in the direction of export development and the continuation of suitable control over our purchases abroad.

Reduction Process

5. Furthermore, the Monetary Board has decided to begin a process of reducing prior deposits on imports in order to lower the cost of purchasing the various goods brought into the country, since the goals of the stabilization program are being achieved.

Effective this 1 November, imports on list I, segment B will require a prior deposit of only 10 percent, while those on list II will require a prior deposit of 25 percent. This represents a 50-percent reduction in the amount of such deposits in comparison with the percentages currently in effect.

Effective on 1 January 1984, the requirement for a prior deposit on all imports brought into the country will be eliminated.

This decision will help correct the liquidity problems being faced by the financial system and the business sector, since it is estimated that funds totaling between 600 and 700 million sucres will be freed up monthly.

As of this date, more than 4.7 billion sucres are on deposit with the Central Bank as prior deposits. That money will be placed back in circulation as each of the respective liabilities expires.

11798

CSO: 3348/34

PERSPECTIVES FOR 1984 ECONOMIC RECOVERY ANALYZED

Guayaquil EL UNIVERSO in Spanish 17 Oct 83 p 2

[Commentary by Jaime Veliz Litardo]

[Text] The documents covering renegotiation of the public foreign debt, a new loan of \$431 million, and the continuation of commercial lines of credit were signed in New York last Wednesday. At the same time, a start was made on the signing of contracts covering the renegotiation of private debt.

This is one step in the effort to reorganize the national economy, and in fact, it marks the start of a new phase--that of renegotiating the foreign debt for 1984, since the renegotiation that has now been completed has reference to 1983, which will end in 2.5 months. Like the previous one, this renegotiation will be an arduous job, but it will have one advantage, and that is the experience gained in the past 10 months of continuous negotiations.

A special point has been made of the fact that the terms on which the 1983 debt was renegotiated were very severe. There is reason to hope that this time, the agreement concerning Ecuador's obligations will be on easier terms so that the national budget will not be harmed so much by the disbursements effected in payment of those liabilities. Considering the state of the national budget, funds allocated to the foreign debt constitute a genuine and distressing straitjacket delaying the incipient efforts to stimulate the country's economic and social development.

Additionally, one needs to remember the statement by Minister of Finance Pedro Pinto Rubianes to the effect that the country cannot have any illusions and that it will be necessary to work hard in the future to solve our economy's internal problems, lower the inflation rate, and seek to improve the exchange rate on the open market.

For his part, the head of the Ecuadorean negotiating team, Jose A. Correa, said that the country's economic recovery is a very extensive problem--not merely one of credit, but one requiring reorganization in the areas of taxes, currency, and production. Correa, who is chairman of the Monetary Board, emphasized that the country's recovery will depend on our ability as Ecuadoreans to produce more--especially more of those export products which will provide us with the

foreign exchange we must have to pay the extremely high interest we owe as a result of the debt level and to pay for our imports.

Signs of Crisis

According to forecasts by the Central Bank, the Ecuadorean economy will record a negative rate (-0.4 percent) by the end of 1983--for the first time since 1968--based on an analysis by CENDES (Industrial Development Center of Ecuador), which also says that that result is the culmination of the economic slowdown experienced by the country over the past 4 years.

The evaluation by CENDES points out that all economic activities will experience negative real rates with the exception of crude oil and natural gas, which have rallied enough to help alleviate to some extent the nation's difficult economic situation.

In comparison with the 1982 level, the added value from manufacturing activity in 1983 will decline by 1.2 percent in real terms.

Escaping that sharp decline are the textile, clothing, and leather sectors, which will grow by 6.3 percent; metal products, machinery, equipment, and so on, which will grow by 4.9 percent; and, lastly, chemical, coal, and plastic products, which will grow by 1.9 percent.

Petroleum Forecasts

Ecuador will earn foreign exchange totaling between \$7 billion and \$8 billion from its petroleum exports, according to an adviser to the National Chamber of Representatives, who supported his statement by saying that petroleum production will average 250,000 barrels daily over the next 5 years. Of that amount, 115,000 barrels will be exported as crude oil and 17,000 as fuel oil, leaving 120,000 barrels daily for domestic consumption.

At a price of \$29 per barrel, the flow of foreign exchange will provide total revenues of \$1.4 billion, but that may rise to \$1.5 billion if there is a minimum average increase of 10 percent over the 5-year period.

The legislative adviser is making predictions in a very tricky and fickle area, and the results might lead our planners into error. In the government before 1979, it became almost a governmental game to make projections concerning various areas. It would be said that after a certain time, for example, tax collections were going to total so many sucres and centavos. Those assertions never came true. Statistics is a very tricky subject, even more so when it is concerned with economics, and its handling must be solidly based and thoroughly thought out, on penalty of falling into error or, what is more serious, distorting reality.

Commodity Exchange

Judging from the way things have been going in recent weeks, establishment of the Guayaquil Commodity Exchange is looking more and more like a reality. That

exchange will be managed at first by the Guayaquil Stock Exchange. Over the past 2 weeks, experts from the FAO and representatives of public bodies and private enterprise have been making an exhaustive analysis of the necessary mechanism for allowing certificates issued by approved public and private warehousing companies to be traded on the exchange.

Those discussions have taken place at the Guayaquil Stock Exchange, whose executive and managing bodies have participated. It is hoped that as a result of those meetings, the commodity exchange will soon be put in operation. To begin with, the exchange will deal in registered documents covering stores of rice and corn, but later it will extend its operations to cover soybeans and wheat.

It should be pointed out that the Guayaquil Stock Exchange had already made considerable progress in that direction, since in 1981 it was hard at work on the project with experts from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and advisers from the Bogota Commodity Exchange. Legal support for the proposal is provided by the Law on Agricultural Promotion and Development, article 47 of which directs the government to establish commodity exchanges as an effective means of stabilizing prices and channeling funds in an organized manner into agricultural production and marketing.

A cabinet decree was also issued in 1979 stipulating that pending passage of the Agricultural Marketing Law and formal establishment of the commodity exchanges, legally issued warehouse warrants covering agricultural products could be traded freely on the stock exchanges. That is what is being done now.

This means that the relevant legal instrument exists, as does the warehousing infrastructure, which is provided by the facilities belonging to ENAC [National Enterprise for Warehousing and Marketing], CEDEGE [Study Commission for the Development of the Guayas Basin], ALMAGRO, and numerous modern and adequate private warehouses which, upon being duly approved and authorized, may issue negotiable certificates.

Trading in such certificates therefore represents a firm and positive step toward the immediate establishment of the commodity exchange, and this is unquestionably the most appropriate way to market basic national commodities, an effective tool for price control, an acceptable incentive for ensuring the marketing of farm production, and an efficient way of guiding the country toward the establishment of warehousing systems. Along with prices, the warehousing system is the Achilles' heel of agricultural activity.

Persuading the stock exchange, which will handle the trading in the documents, and the managers of the state-owned and private firms, which will issue the certificates, to participate in the analysis made over the past 2 weeks ensures a good start toward the desired objective.

Fourteenth Payroll

At the end of the week, the president of the republic signed the law, passed by the Chamber of Representatives, which stipulates that the 14th payment of remuneration for civil servants, police, and pensioners covered by the IESS

[Ecuadorean Social Security Institute] will be double the minimum wage--that is, 11,200 sucres. This law will benefit 270,000 government employees, excluding the members of the Armed Forces, and it represents the disbursement of 1.5 million sucres, for which the funds do not exist.

It should be pointed out that in approving the law, the legislators did not provide any financing to cover the disbursement, which will unquestionably inflate even further the already excessive tax deficit. That fact will compel the Ministry of Finance to make adjustments and utilize the mechanisms for obtaining funds through taxes. For the present, new taxes on so-called sumptuary items under the Law on Selective Consumption have been announced.

For its part, the IESS says that since the increase in the 14th payment to its pensioners is not provided for in the budget, it will undertake a study to determine where it will obtain those funds.

The government says that even though this law further burdens the budget and makes the critical situation in the national treasury worse, it was approved because it is in keeping with the government's policy of remuneration.

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CSO: 3348/34

VOTER REGISTRATION PROPOSAL MEETS STIFF OPPOSITION

Completely New Voter Registration

Guatemala City DIARIO EL GRAFICO in Spanish 31 Oct 83 p 8

[Text] The registration of citizens that the Citizens Register plans to carry out will start from scratch, according to Mario Guerra Roldan, the head of that organism. He categorically stated that he had not found any electoral list in the old Electoral Register that could be used as the basis. For that very reason, in order to have confidence and security in a clean return to constitutional order, he will have to start from scratch to draw up a new electoral list. It is necessary for all the political parties, private initiative and the state institutions to participate in this.

He said: "The fact is that we do not have a list. It can be done again. With persistent work, we could register the first million during the first months of next year. Our goal has been 2 million registered although some are pessimistic."

He said that it is necessary that we all understand that we have the mission of taking the country forward. State workers like us and those in any office have a mission, an aim and an objective. "In my case it is to serve the citizenry, to serve the people, because we are administrators of the people, because they have brought us here in some way, for some reason. My basic objective is to help Guatemala leave this major crossroads--that is, to return to constitutional order. I trust in God that we will achieve this." He concluded: "Let this be the right road that leads us to the solution. We understand that there are many exceptions but we do not have another alternative in sight. No matter how difficult, we must continue that steady progress toward institutionalization."

CEDEP Calls Proposal Long-Range

Guatemala City DIARIO EL GRAFICO in Spanish 31 Oct 83 p 8

[Text] CEDEP [Center for Political Studies] issued some observations revealing its opposition to the system outlined in the executive branch's bill to carry out a direct registration of citizens who must vote in the elections for a constitutional assembly.

Among other opinions, CEDEP stated that the intention of carrying out a direct registration to create a new system of voter identification is clearly beneficial for the country but it is a long-term procedure.

It said: "This process is not more important than the need to hold reliable, clean elections accepted by all the sectors participating in the process and with credibility for all the citizens."

"The desire to carry out a hasty procedure (in 6 months) endangers the electoral process because it permits sectors with good or bad intentions to call that process limited and challenge it with plenty of reason."

"A direct registration is not indispensable for a clean and reliable electoral list. The system proposed by CEDEP is equally reliable."

It also stated that "there is no justification to insist on direct registration. This endangers the elections because there might not be enough citizens registered. There is no enthusiasm or confidence in the electoral process."

In the note sent to the Ministry of Government containing its opinions, it concluded that "the project in Article 5 is outdated since it places the civic rights and duties of the literate and illiterate on different levels."

Use of Existing Rolls Suggested

Guatemala City DIARIO EL GRAFICO in Spanish 31 Oct 83 p 8

[Text] Guatemala, 30 Oct--Oscar Humberto Rivas, secretary general of the PID [Democratic Institutional Party], presented his party's opinion that the procedure of direct registration could mean that the registration would still be in process in 1984. This strays from the objective of returning to constitutional order in the shortest time possible.

The PID leader said: "We believe that this procedure is going to delay the democratization of the country if we understand this as the prompt return to a state of law in our fatherland."

He stated: "We say this because we believe that the minimum number of citizens registered for a real election must be sufficiently representative--at least 1 million citizens, according to the recent statement of the president of the TSE [Supreme Electoral Tribunal]. Before, it had not indicated the minimum number required nor is there any law on this but it is logical to require representativeness."

Humberto Rivas added: "The PID hopes it is not mistaken but political experience tells us that it will be difficult to reach this minimum of 1 million in the new registration established in the bill on the Citizens Register Law."

He added: "I believe that the procedure suggested by the PID must be followed --that is, the electoral list can be done simply, without so many complications, by taking the existing data from the civil registers of the republic

and updating them as has been done so many times because of poorly done identity documents." He concluded: "This list can be the solution to obtaining a correct electoral list quickly and at a very low cost."

CAN, PUA, DC Note Contradictions

Guatemala City DIARIO EL GRAFICO in Spanish 1 Nov 83 p 8

[Text] Hector Mayora (CAN)

"The problem of the electoral list is complex but it can be solved with goodwill and realism. The first thing is for the government officials to agree." Hector Mayora Dawe, assistant secretary general of CAN [Authentic Nationalist Central Organization], stated this yesterday when commenting on the problem of electoral registration.

He added: "The chief of state's intention was clear that his government be short-lived as any transitory government should be. His basic objective was the country's return to constitutional order. However, we now see that the criteria issued by the TSE seem to contradict the executive branch's basic position since it speaks of a census procedure that would take us a year or more in order to be able to hold just elections."

Asked about the bases of the contradictions he sees between the executive branch and the TSE, he answered: "As I indicated before, the chief of state's initial position, endorsed and applauded by all Guatemalans, demonstrated that his objective was to return to constitutionality and a prompt call for elections. He even hinted at a turnover to an elected government by the end of 1984 or, at the latest, January 1985. Now the TSE wants to carry out direct registration which obviously cannot be done quickly. If it cannot be done quickly, it lengthens the term for elections and the turnover of power which produces a contradiction in the basic objective."

He added: "I believe that we always have to keep in mind the final objective we pursue. If that objective is the prompt return to a constitutional framework, we pursue that objective by seeking to overcome the obstacles to achieve it. In other words, we seek a way to carry out the registration as quickly as possible without losing control over it."

Sisniega Otero (PUA)

"The registration process is not an obligation of the political parties. That obligation is a clear and defined obligation of the government of the republic. It has always corresponded to the state to do this."

Lionel Sisniega Otero, secretary general of the PUA [Anticommunist Unification Party], stated this when commenting on the bill submitted for the consideration of the political groups.

Sisniega Otero added that his political party is analyzing the bill and will send it back immediately with the observations and corrections it considers appropriate.

Lionel Sisniega Otero added: "I believe that the people are not going to come to register in the centers set up for this purpose without more pressure. There must be motivation and a special feeling of confidence."

He added: "The bill as it is worded has contradictory aspects which are poorly adapted to reality. For example, Article 4 stipulates punishment for those who are not registered; for instance, they might lose their jobs. However, if we look at the scope of the provision, the sanctions are directed only at those who work for the state. It is a measure of pressure that is not fair; there is no sense of justice and equality."

He said: "Also illiteracy does not negate citizenship. Consequently, it is not sufficient reason to exclude people from the obligation of exercising their right to vote, their duty and their family example, in this order."

He pointed out: "We also have many 65-year-old people who in their daily life are very interested in solving the problems of Guatemala. There is no justification to exclude them from that obligation which is a symbol that they can still exercise that civic enthusiasm."

Cabrera Hidalgo (DC)

"The basic problem is more serious. The necessary conditions are not present so that the people trust in the correctness of this registration mechanism." Alfonso Cabrera Hidalgo, assistant secretary general of the Guatemalan Christian Democracy Party, stated this when commenting on the partisan discussion that this bill was subjected to.

He added: "It is obvious that, in the first place, the Ministry of Government left little time for the political parties to give their opinions on the registration law. This week was the last date to send in our opinions. Apparently, the idea is to pass the bill at the beginning of this week in November. However, it is obvious that the law suffers from a number of problems. Among others, we can point out that its application will require a great effort from the government to create an awareness in the public of the need for the citizens to come register. Of course, this problem can be resolved if the government of the republic carries out a massive campaign."

Alfonso Cabrera added: "However, the basic problem is more serious because, in terms of the political process itself, there is a high degree of uncertainty and lack of confidence in the process of democratization."

"Also the bill proposed contains defects that could become instruments of deformation."

Alfonso Cabrera revealed that his political group concluded its observations which will be sent to the executive branch so that it can learn the party's opinion on the bill.

Registration Could Jeopardize Elections

Guatemala City DIARIO EL GRAFICO in Spanish 30 Oct 83 p 31

[Text] The government bill for the "Citizens Registration and Census Law" was completely rejected this week. It was felt that it contains provisions that will delay the announced elections for the national constitutional assembly.

That bill was proposed to the chief of state, Gen Oscar Mejia Victores, by the TSE because of the recent elimination of the General Population Register.

Essentially, the political circles criticize the plan for direct and optional registration. It is argued that by being direct, it is materially impossible to carry it out properly before the date fixed for elections for the constitutional assembly, 1 July 1982 [as published]. Its optional nature is also censured since only those who know how to read and write are required to register.

The rejected bill will order that "the operations of registering citizens and forming electoral lists properly classified by department and municipality will be the responsibility of the Citizens Register. Registration will be done through the presentation of identity documents and these will be verified by the establishment stipulated in this law."

It also stated that: "For registration and census, any citizen of either sex who knows how to read and write has the obligation of registering at the proper locality within a term of 6 months from 1 November. Those who do not register cannot exercise political rights, hold public positions or jobs or obtain passports as long as their identity documents lack the registration mark."

The articles add that "illiterate citizens have the option of registering" and "these citizens will request registration verbally in the places indicated."

"The census-taker will carry out the registration operations in the presence of the requesting citizen in accord with the procedure that the Citizens Register adopts and the TSE approves."

Delaying Procedure

During a meeting held Tuesday with Chief of State Gen Oscar Mejia Victores, Ramiro de Leon Carpio, secretary general of the UCN [Union of the National Center], pointed out the problems of direct registration of citizens as the TSE has proposed.

The leader of the centrist party pointed out that it would be a very slow procedure that would become an obstacle to the proper development of popular elections.

CEDEP directors Danilo Barillas, Armando Dieguez Pilon and Gabriel Larios maintained Wednesday that direct registration will become a source of discontent that could even make the current process to return to constitutional order fail.

Barillas said: "Election day will come and the electoral list will not be finished. This will mean that thousands of people will not be able to exercise their right to vote."

Updating Lists

CEDEP felt that, instead of a slow registration citizen by citizen, a list should be quickly drawn up by updating the lists of identity documents.

After asking the TSE to postpone its bill that would begin in November, it has suggested updating the lists of those who have identity documents by comparing the books of registration, births and deaths.

Actually, the planned direct registration endangers the entire political process that has begun. Within a few months, there will be a serious crisis in the country due to the lack of an electoral list, a list of Guatemalans able to vote in the next elections.

In addition to affecting many potential voters, it will encourage the enemies of the electoral process to attack it as inefficient.

It would be a serious mistake to continue with this system. As the political organizations and the experts in our electoral situation noted, it would be a lengthy process.

The system the TSE proposes endangers the realization of the elections for a national constitutional assembly since it is very likely that there will not be enough citizens who want to carry out the tedious procedure of showing up to register on time.

PR Supports Obligatory Registration

Guatemala City DIARIO EL GRAFICO in Spanish 4 Nov 83 p 8

[Text] The proposal of Napoleon Alfaro's directorate to carry out direct registration states that the municipalities have not recorded changes in residence which would cause many duplications.

The deaths due to violence and the 1976 earthquake are not recorded. According to the data of the last census in 1981, there are 176,000 persons widowed, 136,000 of them women.

Thousands of Guatemalans have emigrated because of terror and insecurity. Internally, masses of the rural population have moved to urban areas.

Napoleon Alfaro and the members of the provisional directorate stated that registration must be obligatory for all citizens, literate and illiterate.

He pointed out that it is discrimination not to make it obligatory for illiterates.

The other points in the proposal sent to the Citizens Register stipulate that the state entities and private enterprise must supervise registration of their permanent workers.

"The obligatory registration must include the members of the civilian self-defense patrols. The citizens can register in the place of their normal residence even if their identity documents have been issued in another municipality."

He said: "The Citizens Register must have enough census-takers organized and distributed so that they can register the approximately 3 million citizens in 160 days."

UNE Warns Against Precipitous Action

Guatemala City DIARIO EL GRAFICO in Spanish 4 Nov 83 p 8

[Text] Contrary to what the secretary general of the government, Col Manuel de Jesus Giron Sanchez, stated when he said that no committee had presented an opinion on the registration bill, the committee for the UNE [National Equi-cratic Union] reported that it presented a lengthy study on this to the Ministry of Government as well as the TSE with specific recommendations on form as well as content.

The members of the UNE began their presentation with the question: Do we want to achieve a precipitous constitutional order that involves the danger of again committing the vices and mistakes of the past because of haste? They explained: "If the answer is affirmative, let us legislate hastily and let us submit ourselves to the implacable judgment of history for our irresponsible action. This means letting ourselves be manipulated by the frenzied pressure of those who think that each day that passes without returning to 'constitutionality' is one day lost in achieving their personal and selfish ambitions...."

They categorically indicated that it must be kept in mind that a de facto government should not call for the formation of a national constitutional assembly although it can by the right of might, according to the UNE.

They explained that the only call for such an event should be made by the citizens genuinely represented by their pressure groups which are the socioeconomic and cultural sectors. Properly represented, they would constitute the upper house which would be the best place--due to its real popular representation--to issue, in the name of the sovereign people, the provisions for the formation of a national constitutional assembly. Later, this would determine the possibility of a decree that establishes relations like those that the bill regulates.

'Third Position' Party Approves

Guatemala City DIARIO EL GRAFICO in Spanish 4 Nov 83 p 8

[Text] According to reports attributed to the secretary of government, Col Manuel de Jesus Sanchez, in the afternoon newspapers yesterday, Wednesday,

2 November, and today, 3 November, no committee for the formation of a political party responded with its opinion on the bill that the TSE proposed to the executive branch. This bill was sent to all the committees by the Ministry of Government.

The Democratic Justicialista Third Position respectfully informs the people that the day after having received Circular No. 50 from the Ministry of Government, signed by the vice minister and stamped urgent, we answered with a number of explanations about the amendments we proposed for the bill that was sent to us.

In that response addressed to Vice Minister Haroldo Cabrera Enriquez, we revealed the following, among other concepts: "The text of the Citizens Registration and Census Law satisfies our idea expressed to the TSE in the already mentioned memorandum with the amendments that I present to you with this.

"Our satisfaction lies in the government planning to draw up an electoral list not to serve itself or serve others with a multimillion list of identity documents issued since 1932, lists which have already been discredited by the number of electoral frauds committed with them for many years."

Supreme Electoral Tribunal Responds

Guatemala City DIARIO EL GRAFICO in Spanish 4 Nov 83 p 8

[Text] Guatemala, 3 Oct [as published]--The TSE indicated today that the decision to make the vote and the census optional for illiterates "must be taken as a privilege because conditions for illiterates are not the same as for the majority of literate citizens."

The TSE headed by Arturo Herbruger Asturias stated that "the illiterate citizen is given the optional right to register for the electoral list as a concession of those rights which can in no way imply discrimination. It is, rather, a privilege that is justified in this case considering special economic and cultural situations. Otherwise, requiring the illiterate citizen to go to registration places would repeat the reprehensible impositions and methods of the past under the threat of sanctions that must be banished from our fatherland."

TSE for Direct Registration

Referring to the opposition shown by the parties toward direct registration, the TSE stated that registration through the physical appearance of the citizens is opposed. It has been proposed that registration be done by compiling the lists of identity documents issued by the municipalities during the last 50 years.

"This procedure expounded by CEDEP was carefully studied by the TSE which reached a negative conclusion since at least half of such a list would consist of dead persons."

"The method suggested to exclude the deceased--a comparison with lists of death entries--did not seem adequate to us since there are more than 300 civil registers in the republic. This would involve millions which could only be compared by registration in a large computer center."

Even then, the results would be affected by the fact that in our popular sectors in the city as well as the rural area there is a very large number of the same names.

It concluded: "Therefore, the TSE was grateful to CEDEP for its collaboration and regretted that it could not accept its initiative which would only help perhaps once. It is necessary and indispensable to proceed, sooner or later, to electoral lists that are real and can be updated."

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CS0: 3248/159 & 162

INGUAT ACCUSES U.S. PROMOTER OF CONTRACT BREACH

Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 7 Nov 83 p 8

[Text] The director of the Guatemalan Institute of Tourism (INGUAT), Mario Mendoza Hidalgo, will file a claim against a U.S. company for alleged damage to the tourist industry, according to information released to the media.

The director of INGUAT released the following official report on this subject:

"Guatemala has been cheated by the U.S. firm of William H. Coleman, Inc., by its failure to award it the 1984 International Tourism Fair as was promised in a specific agreement.

"Guatemala will suffer economic damage amounting to at least 5 million quetzals; therefore, on the basis of the existing agreement, INGUAT is empowered to take legal action against the above-mentioned firm in a United States Federal Court.

"This is the second time that this U.S. company has failed to meet its commitment, as it previously failed to honor the same commitment and for that reason legal action was taken in the United States Federal Court. The suit was dropped in exchange for the holding of the Interantional Tourism Fair in our country the following year.

"Confronted by this problem, the private tourist sector and the institution of which I am director have made common cause, as set forth in the following communique:

"The private tourist sector of Guatemala and the Guatemalan Institute of Tourism (INGUAT) jointly declare:

"I. Our complaint against the William H. Coleman, Inc. promotional company for once again having deprived us of the International Tourism Fair to which we were entitled in 1984.

"For the information of the national and international tourism sectors we offer this brief summary:

"In 1980, Guatemala was cheated for the first time out of holding the tourism fair in our country by the company which promotes this event, known

internationally as William H. Coleman, Inc., when it suddenly suspended the holding of the tourism fair in Guatemala. As a result of this action, the authorities of INGUAT at that time filed a suit in the United States Federal Court, which ended in the signing of an agreement in Jacksonville, Florida on 17 August 1983. In exchange for withdrawal of the suit by INGUAT, the defendant company, William H. Coleman, Inc., committed itself to the holding of the 1984 tourism fair in the city of Guatemala.

"II. Yesterday a letter was received from that company informing us that once again we had been deprived of our legal right to hold the 1984 tourism fair in this country and that also once again Lima, Peru would be the site of the fair that year. Naturally, this caused grave damage to the interests of Guatemala which undertook legal and high-level promotional action to attain that objective. At present, the necessary consultations are being held between the INGUAT agent's office in Miami and the group of INGUAT consultant attorneys in Guatemala with a view to discussing this action in U.S. courts.

"We have participated strongly in all the fairs, including the last one held in Quito, Ecuador in October 1983 and received generous demonstrations of solidarity and support which leave no doubt about the selection of our country as the site of the fair next year, a circumstance that further aggravates the situation upon which we are commenting.

"The private tourism sector in Guatemala and INGUAT call upon the national press and foreign correspondents for their support in making this action known as one more insult to our beloved country."

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CSO: 3248/174

BRIEFS

HONEY PRODUCTION--The country's apicultural production for domestic consumption and export (honey, wax, pollen and jelly) totals 9 million quetzals, according to a report in the press bulletin of the Technical Institute for Training and Production [INTECAP]. Guatemala has an estimated 2,400 practicing apiculturists; 150 professional apiculturists, who were graduated from INTECAP; and 6 apiculturists who graduated abroad. There are about 161,000 beehives which produce 4 million kilograms of honey, 2,500 kilograms of pollen, 75,000 kilograms of wax and 5 kilograms of royal jelly. The apicultural activity is to be found in Peten, the northern and southern coasts, the southeast, interior valleys and other accessible places with suitable ecology. The report adds that the institute has had a well organized livestock department for many years, which keeps strict control over this activity. With the possible arrival of the African bee, a Center for Technological Training has been established to deal with this insect, whose schedule now mentions an international conference to be held from the 16th to the 18th of this month, with the participation of foreign and national technicians. [Text] [Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 7 Nov 83 pp 7, 86] 8143

CSO: 3248/174

BRIEFS

NEW PSD OFFICIALS--Guillermo Potoy and Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Barrios are the new organization and political secretaries of the Social Democratic Party. The former replaces Ruddy Ibarra, who resigned from his post; and the latter was elected because of his devotion to party activities. This information was supplied by the secretariat of that political organization to a DIARIO DE LOS NICARAGUENSES reporter. The names of the national authorities were also released for the information of the public, political parties, trade union organizations and diplomatic missions. The National Executive Council (CEN) consists of the following persons: the secretary general, Dr Luis Rivas Leiva; the political secretary, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Barrios; the organization secretary, Guillermo Potoy; the political training secretary, Dr Manuel Matus Sequeira; the communications secretary, Armodio Mendieta; the ceremonies and agreements secretary, Dr Francisco Saborio; the trade union labor and peasant relations secretary, Mauricio Manzanares; the international relations secretary, Gilmore Coe; and the finance secretary, Adolfe Jarquin. The auxiliary organizations are: Social Democratic Youth, whose secretary-general is Ramon Martinez; and Social Democratic Women, whose secretary-general is Lorena Obando and whose executive assistant to the secretariat general is Dr Maria Elena Selva. [Text] [Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 23 Oct 83 p 1] 8143

TOBACCO PRODUCTION--Tobacco production for export next year will generate revenues of \$16 million for our country, and in 1986 it is expected that the figure will be more than \$100 million. This information was released yesterday by the Agrarian Reform Agroindustrial Tobacco Complex (CATRA). The information was supplied to a high-level delegation from the Revolutionary Government headed by Dr Sergio Ramirez Mercado, a member of the JGRN [Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction], and commander of the revolution, Jaime Wheelock Roman, minister of agricultural-livestock development and agrarian reform during an extended tour of several tobacco plantations. In our country, 1,400 manzanas are planted with tobacco; and according to CATRA projections, it is expected that from 1986 onward more than 8,000 manzanas of tobacco will be planted, making this crop one of the principal export products. [Excerpts] [Managua EL NUEVO DIARIO in Spanish 31 Oct 83 pp 1, 9] 8143

MORE SOVIET AID--The INAA [Nicaraguan Water and Sewage Institute] is receiving tools, machinery, heavy equipment and accessories from the USSR, corresponding to a line of credit of approximately \$3 million. The equipment includes drainage pumps, pipe and hydrogeologic tools. This line of credit is part of an overall package of aid granted the government through ENIMPORT. [Text] [Managua EL NUEVO DIARIO in Spanish 10 Nov 83 p 4] 8143

NEW PPSCA SYMBOLS--The National Directorate of the Authentic Popular Social Christian Party has approved the new symbols which will be sent to the Electoral Commission for recognition and approval, in conformity with the Political Parties Law. This information was given to a LA PRENSA reporter by Armando Sanchez Vazquez, president of that political organization. The flag which the Authentic Popular Social Christian Party will use for its party activities will have two colors: blue and yellow. Blue represents the fatherland and yellow stands for the authentic Christians who are members of that political party. The symbol consists of stripes or divisions: in the upper part is the Christian church; in the middle the family, which is the foundation of society; and at the bottom nature, the city and its different activities which represent reality. [Text] [Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 7 Nov 83 pp 1, 10] 8143

NORTHERN BRIDGES REPAIRED--A total of 412 workers made up into mobile construction brigades are repairing and maintaining the bridges in the Segovias region. The work consists in constructing the Isabel, Caulatu and Colgante bridges at a cost of 800,000 cordobas (the work began on 17 January and was completed on 15 August 1983) and rebuilding and reinforcing the bridges sabotaged by the counterrevolution sponsored by imperialism which is attacking and invading our country from Honduras. In spite of these attacks the MICONS [Ministry of Construction] workers are repairing and reinforcing the following bridges: Dipilto, in Jalapa; Jacote, in Condega; and Rio Cocom in Ocotal, at a cost of more than 1 million cordobas. The work was begun in the month of May and was completed on 30 September 1983. Maintenance work was also done on the following bridges: Los Limones, Macaralji y San Fernando, Macarali, Mozoli, Inteli, Condega, El Higuero, Los Lirios, La Sirena and El Azupo, at a cost of more than 1 million cordobas with national funds, one more task completed by the Revolutionary Government for the people. [Text] [Managua EL NUEVO DIARIO in Spanish 8 Nov 83 p 4] 8143

CSO: 3248/190

ALIBUX: RELATIONS WITH CUBA 'ONLY RESTORED TO HEALTH'

Paramaribo DE WARE TIJD in Dutch 28 Oct 83 p 1

[Television "interview" with Prime Minister Errol Alibux, 26 October]

[Text] Diplomatic relations with Cuba have not been broken off.

There is no connection between the invasion of Grenada and the measures taken by the Suriname government.

The measures were taken because of internal events in Grenada itself. They have not a single connection with the invasion of Grenada by foreign troops.

Polarization

We have seen how a powerful unity was turned overnight into a powerful polarization among the army officers, so even the leaders and not all the officers had to lose their lives. What happened there should never be repeated anywhere.

It forced us to intercede in our own camp in order to keep it from taking place in Suriname.

We have honestly checked out which of these factors could be present here. And we saw, among other things, that our relationship with our Cuban friends over the past few months, through the stormy development of that relationship, through the multitude of activities undertaken by our Cuban friends in the past few months, that that relationship has become difficult to survey.

Reorganization of Relationship

In order to gain full certainty and eliminate all risks that, through this difficulty in surveying the situation, this sort of polarization among our army officers could arise, we intended to choose the certain over the uncertain, and we simply reorganized relations. Once again, we have broken off not one single relationship with our Cuban friends.

We have simply reorganized the relationship. We have brought the relationship back to where we can survey it, in order to be able to construct relations systematically and in a guaranteed way with still more consciousness, with

still more comradeship, with still more friendliness in the interest of our revolution, of our fatherland.

The door is not being opened wide to other powers through this. In three and a half years we have fought for an independence which we will never abandon to anyone.

Concerning the invasion of Grenada, Prime Minister Alibux explained that Suriname can never approve of the invasion, based on the principle of noninterference respected by Suriname; that is, the noninterference in internal affairs of another country, and noninterference means not invading another country.

What we now see is that the Americans together with several reactionary islands perpetrated an invasion of Grenada.

And that is something of which we can never approve. The government is in constant deliberation about what steps we can take as a free nation to stand by these principles of noninterference and nonintervention in the world community. We are busy examining what steps we can take independently on a diplomatic level to expose this.

Diplomatic Steps

At any rate, we will support 100 percent all diplomatic steps taken by other countries and other peoples (Nicaragua, Libya, Cuba, Guyana). We cannot permit large countries to simply invade small countries. Small countries do not entirely agree with what happens in large countries as well, but those small countries do not invade large countries. Thus, we stand completely behind this principle.

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